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Summary 
 
Despite relatively high growth rates, improvements in poverty and inequality have been 
constrained in many developing countries over the last decade, suggesting that economic 
growth has not been inclusive. In part, this relates to low levels of participation in the formal 
economy as well as high incidence of informality and unemployment in these countries. This 
research seeks to explore the relationship between informality and inclusive growth in sub-
Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on South Africa. South Africans typically hold one of 
two opposing views on the informal sector. The first is that informality should be encouraged 
as an under-utilised source of new employment; the second is that it should be discouraged 
as an inferior source of employment. The central research question is therefore: ‘Do informal 
labour markets promote or constrain inclusive growth?’ In order to examine the hypotheses, 
we use three different methodologies. Firstly, we undertake a regional evidence synthesis 
examining literature and case studies from the sub-Saharan Africa region. Secondly, we 
expand on the South African case study and examine the nature of transitions within the 
labour market. Thirdly, we examine to what extent income shocks may impact the likelihood 
of engagement within the informal sector.  
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Executive summary 
 
In the last decade, developing economies have recorded relatively high growth rates, yet in a 
number of instances, there is a limited impact on poverty and inequality, suggesting that 
economic growth is not inclusive. In part, this relates to the fact that a large number of 
individuals are not participating in the formal economy and are informally employed or are 
unemployed, a phenomenon observed in both Africa and Latin America. The informal sector 
provides a range of heterogeneous employment opportunities. However, with many adults 
isolated from the formal economy, the inclusiveness of economic growth in these regions has 
arguably been constrained. This research seeks to better understand the relationship 
between informality and inclusive growth in Africa, with a particular focus on South Africa. 
South Africa stands out in the region for having relatively high levels of unemployment and 
low levels of informal employment. As a result, one of two opposing views is typically held by 
South Africans: the first is that the informal sector is an under-utilised source of new 
employment and it should be promoted since ‘any employment is better than unemployment’; 
the second view is that informality should be discouraged given its inferior quality, and that 
the focus should be on creating decent jobs in the formal sector. The central research 
question is therefore: ‘Do informal labour markets promote or constrain inclusive growth?’  
We investigate three hypotheses in terms of the central research question: 
 
i. Informality may promote inclusive growth by acting as a buffer to unemployment and 
creating opportunities for vulnerable populations 
ii. Informality may constrain inclusive growth by negatively impacting growth and jobs in 
the formal sector 
iii. Facilitating transitions from unemployment to informal employment and from informality 
to formality through public policy promotes inclusive growth 
 
In order to examine the hypotheses, we use three different methodologies. Firstly, we 
undertake a regional evidence synthesis examining literature and case studies that lend 
themselves to the hypotheses within the sub-Saharan Africa region. Secondly, we expand on 
the South African case study and examine the nature of transitions within the labour market. 
This includes the transition into the informal labour market from a state of unemployment as 
well as transitions from the informal to the formal labour market. In the South African case, 
where unemployment is significant, transitioning into the labour market is likely to improve an 
individual’s earnings and welfare thereby promoting inclusivity within with economy. Thirdly, 
we examine to what extent income shocks may impact the likelihood of engagement within 
the informal sector. In the case of South Africa, we examine whether household receipt of 
non-contributory state pensions, by relaxing household-level resource constraints, impacts 
the level of engagement in the informal sector at the household level. 
In terms of the three hypotheses, the regional evidence on sub-Saharan Africa suggests a 
number of key findings. Firstly, the informal sector promotes inclusive growth through 
providing an alternative to unemployment when there are no alternative employment 
opportunities available. This is particularly relevant for people with lower education, and for 
women and young people. In addition, we find that in certain countries there are instances 
where self-employment becomes an option during economic downturn, negatively impacting 
the agricultural sector in particular. Secondly, the informal sector may inhibit inclusive growth 
if workers are put in precarious positions, such as when earnings and benefits are 
outweighed by ill health and job insecurity. Thirdly, the impact of the informal sector on the 
formal sector will depend on the size of an informal enterprise, proximity to consumers as 
well as linkages to the formal sector. It is often the case that the formal and informal sectors 
work at different parts of the value chain to meet the same end objective.  
 
Lastly, the informal sector is a significant economic contributor and employs large majorities 
of individuals in countries within the sub-Saharan African region. Policymakers should 
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therefore be aware of the many livelihoods derived from the informal sector when designing 
policies that promote inclusive growth. Attempts to enforce formalization through regulation 
have often had non-optimal outcomes: micro-enterprises are either pushed out of the market 
or continue to operate informally and institutions are often too weak to enforce compliance. In 
addition, there may be little incentive for micro-enterprises to formalise if the gains from 
operating in the formal sector do not outweigh the costs of formalisation. The evidence 
suggests that firms facing external constraints that can be dealt with in the short term through 
interventions such as providing access to credit, energy sources and space are far more 
likely to grow and prosper than survivalist firms. Survivalist firms would benefit from 
managerial training and other skills. Upon overcoming external constraints, non-survivalist 
firms may grow organically and want to compete in the formal sector. In the African context, 
policymakers should therefore recognise the heterogeneity of informal sector enterprises and 
deal with the various constraints instead of using blanket regulation.  
 
Section five examines informal employment in South Africa in more detail. In terms of the 
labour market transitions we find that individuals are more likely to transition from 
unemployed to formal employment rather than informal employment. Only a minority of 
individuals in the sample transitioned from unemployment into informal self-employment. The 
bulk of those that transitioned from unemployment, however, became economically inactive 
(‘not economically active’). In terms of informal employees, the primary transition observed 
was to formal employee, which is a positive move. The transition from informal self-
employment to formal self-employment is rare and the bulk of the transitions captured from 
the informal self-employment segment were into economic inactivity. These results, and 
particularly the large cohorts transitioning into inactivity, are indicative of South Africa’s small 
informal sector and thus the limited opportunities available for low-skilled individuals. Further, 
while the sub-Saharan Africa region is synonymous with underemployment in the informal 
sector, these transitions to economic inactivity, coupled with high levels of unemployment, 
indicate the relative prevalence of non-employment in South Africa. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the last decade, a number of emerging markets have recorded relatively high growth rates 
yet many struggle to convert this into improvements in well-being, material welfare and 
equality, suggesting that economic growth is not inclusive. In part, this is related to the fact 
that a large number of individuals do not participate in the formal economy and are either 
informally employed or unemployed. Besides having lower household incomes, this group 
may also lack access to non-income welfare benefits provided by the state, thereby 
restricting development outcomes. However, it is also true that for a large proportion of the 
population informal employment may represent a superior alternative to unemployment.  
 
The purpose of this research is to better understand the relationship between informality and 
inclusive growth in different country contexts. Informality is considered to have both positive 
and negative impacts on welfare and inclusive growth. On the one hand, informal 
employment plays a key role in absorbing the unemployed into employment, as well as 
acting as a buffer to unemployment during economic downturn; this may promote the 
inclusivity of economic growth. However, a large informal sector has implications for 
aggregate productivity levels, is often insecure, unstable, poorly remunerated, and lacks 
legislated protections for workers. There are broader economy-wide implications too, as 
informal sector workers do not form part of the tax base. In addition, informal workers are 
often less well off than those in the informal sector, limiting the extent of inclusive growth 
outcomes. These outcomes are, however, highly contextual.  
 
The pressure on African governments to engender inclusive patterns of economic growth is 
immense. The continent has lagged behind the rest of the world in reducing poverty over the 
past two decades. While globally extreme poverty, understood as living on less than $1.25 
per day, more than halved between 1990 and 2011—falling from 36.4 per cent to 14.5 per 
cent—extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa  fell from 56.6 per cent to 46.8 per cent in the 
same period (World Bank Group 2015), with the result that the region now accounts for a 
larger share of extreme poverty worldwide. Economies across the continent have failed to 
create sufficient numbers of jobs for growing populations, meaning that more and more 
people entering into the labour force are finding that the only opportunities for employment 
are within the informal sector. Between 1980 and 2010, the total working-age population in 
sub-Saharan Africa grew by just under 8.5 million per year; over the next 40 years to 2050, it 
is estimated to grow by a further 21.5 million on average annually (own calculations, United 
Nations 2015). Given current labour force participation rates of around 70 per cent among 15 
to 64 year-olds, this translates into demand for more than 1.25 million net new jobs per 
month on average over the next 40 years. Growth among the working-age population has the 
potential to generate significant economic benefits—known as the demographic dividend—
but these benefits can only be fully and sustainably realised if the working-age population 
has access to productive, appropriately remunerated employment. As a result, if sub-
Saharan African countries are to harness the gains associated with the demographic 
dividend, a deeper and more nuanced understanding of informality and its potential effects 
on the degree of inclusivity of economic growth is required. 
 
The policy discourse in South Africa is mixed, and whilst the informal sector can play a key 
role in terms of absorbing the unemployed, its growth has to some extent been constrained 
relative to other countries in the continent, due in varying parts to historical considerations, 
stringent legislation and red tape. Policy making at national, provincial and local levels is not 
consistent and is often conflicting in its approach to the informal sector. However, the 
predominant view is that unemployment can (and should) be lowered through 
entrepreneurship and self-employment in the informal sector. Yet very little is known about 
the rate at which transitions into different types of employment happen and, in particular, 
what factors promote movements into self-employment. By exploring these issues, this paper 
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contributes to filling an important research gap that will be useful for informing policymakers 
of the context in which decisions are made and for making policy recommendations to 
promote more inclusive growth. 
 
Central research question 
Given the importance of promoting inclusive growth and the role that informal labour markets 
play in African economies, the central research question is: ‘Do informal labour markets 
promote or constrain inclusive growth?’ To respond to this question, this study has two key 
aims. Firstly, to understand the nature of transitions from one labour market status to another 
(e.g. from unemployment to informal sector employment), as well as the factors that may 
promote or inhibit these transitions. This offers a starting point to understanding the 
relationship between informal employment and inclusive growth. Secondly, we examine to 
what extent an income shock can affect transition into the labour market. Using data on 
South Africa, we examine the potential relationship between receipt of social benefits and 
household-level engagement in the informal sector. 
 
Throughout the paper, our overriding interest is in understanding the potential impacts of the 
informal sector on inclusive growth. While economic growth is clearly a sine qua non for 
inclusive growth, our focus is on the nature of inclusiveness and we pay particular attention 
to impacts related to reductions in poverty (or, more broadly, welfare) and inequality. 
 
 
2 Research design and methods 
 
2.1 Conceptual issues 
 
This research revolves around two core concepts—inclusive growth and informality—neither 
of which has a universally accepted definition. Inclusive growth is broadly understood as 
growth accompanied by poverty reduction and equitable opportunities for all segments of the 
population. In their note on defining inclusive growth published by the World Bank, 
Ianchovichina and Lundstrom (2009) posit that inclusive growth should ‘[raise] the pace of 
growth and [enlarge] the size of the economy, while leveling the playing field for investment 
and increasing productive employment opportunities’. The African Development Bank views 
inclusive growth as ‘economic growth that results in a wider access to sustainable socio-
economic opportunities for a broader number of people, regions or countries, while protecting 
the vulnerable, all being done in an environment of fairness, equal justice, and political 
plurality’ (AfDB 2013). It is our view that growth cannot be judged to be truly inclusive without 
improvements in equality or, at the very least, reductions in instances of extreme inequality. 
Without a standard definition, measurement of inclusive growth is not standardised either. 
From the perspective of the current research, we consider Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, poverty, inequality, employment opportunities and quality of employment 
(including monetary and non-monetary benefits) as measuring different facets of inclusive 
growth.  
 
For a phenomenon as pervasive as informality, there is surprisingly little consensus on how 
to define it (Kanbur 2009 and 2011). One reason for this confusion relates to the broad yet 
inconsistent use of terms such as ‘the informal sector’, ‘informal employment’ and ‘the 
informal economy’ across the developing world. Fields (2011) explains that, because each 
country may have a specific ‘working definition’ of these terms, estimates of the informal 
economy may be measuring different forms of economic activity. Furthermore, within a 
country, an accepted ‘norm’, rather than a defined rule, for measuring informality may have 
evolved. Since norms are perhaps more open to interpretation, this creates further difficulties 
in measuring informality consistently at the country level.  
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The International Labour Organization (ILO) employs two approaches in defining informality. 
First, the 15th ILO International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) applied an 
enterprise-based approach, defining informal sector employment as ‘all jobs in informal 
sector enterprises or all persons who … were employed in at least one informal enterprise, 
irrespective of their status in employment and whether it was their main or secondary job’ 
(Hussmanns 2004). The 17th ICLS extended the definition by incorporating an employee-
based definition of informality. Thus, it includes characteristics of the employee’s job 
regardless of the ‘formality’ of the enterprise. We make use of both approaches in our 
analysis since together they inform a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of 
informality, and both are used extensively in the literature. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
 
In exploring our central research question, we investigate three specific hypotheses. First, 
informality may promote inclusive growth by acting as a buffer to unemployment and creating 
opportunities for vulnerable populations. By providing incomes to those who might otherwise 
be unemployed, informality allows individuals to engage in the economy and potentially 
benefit from economic growth. This is relevant for the structurally unemployed—those who 
have limited access to the formal labour market—and for the cyclically unemployed who may 
enter the informal sector during economic downturns. 
 
Second, informality may constrain inclusive growth by impacting growth and jobs in the 
formal sector. Lower quality employment and lower productivity in the informal sector 
constrains economic growth at a macro level, and may erode tax income. The ability of 
informal sector firms to avoid various costs associated with operating in the formal sector 
may provide them a competitive advantage, hampering the performance of formal sector 
firms while at the same time undermining incentives for firms to formalise. 
 
Third, facilitating transitions from unemployment to informal employment and from informality 
to formality through public policy promotes inclusive growth. The idea of transitions is 
relevant to both individuals, as they enter and exit different labour market states, and firms, 
which must choose between operating formally or informally. Facilitating transitions may help 
ensure a more efficient allocation of resources and greater benefits for workers, firms and 
society as a whole. What types of policies have been successful (or not) in encouraging 
‘beneficial’ transitions—from unemployment to employment, from informality to formality—for 
both individuals and firms?  
 
2.3 Methodology 
 
In exploring the relationship between informality and inclusive growth, we rely on three key 
methods. 
 
Regional evidence synthesis: Both African and Latin American papers synthesise literature 
and case studies from their respective regions to examine the three hypotheses. As a result 
of this process, we identify the research gaps that we aim to fill through investigating the 
South Africa case study, presented in section 5.  
 
Transition matrices: Transition matrices for the working-age population in South Africa allow 
us to investigate the extent to which there is churning in the labour market, and to identify 
whether certain transitions are particularly common or rare. They also enable the 
identification of differences in mobility for different groups.  
 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD): One of the key questions raised in this research 
revolves around the extent of ‘beneficial’ labour market transitions. Within the South African 
context, the particular transition that we are interested in is that from unemployment to 
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informal sector employment. Since resources often represent a key constraint in seeking 
work or starting a business, we investigate whether a positive income shock—in the form of 
receipt of the state old age pension—has an impact on the likelihood of working-age adults 
taking up informal sector employment. To do this, we employ an RDD method using data 
from the South African General Household Survey of 2014. In this aspect, the Africa and 
Latin America papers diverge methodologically, although both seek to answer the same 
general question: do income shocks facilitate labour market transitions that promote inclusive 
growth? The research undertaken does not expect to obtain a simple answer to this 
question. Instead, it seeks to highlight contexts in which informality may have particular 
implications—whether positive or negative—for the inclusivity of economic growth. 
  
 
3 Informality and inclusive growth in Africa 
 
Despite robust economic growth across the region over the past decade or so, few if any 
sub-Saharan Africa countries translated this into large scale expansion of the formal 
employment sector. Instead, informal employment1 (both inside and outside the informal 
sector) plays a significant role in absorbing labour. Overall informal employment is estimated 
at about 66 per cent of total non-agricultural employment in the sub-Saharan Africa region, 
the bulk of which is represented by informal enterprises and the self-employed (53 per cent 
combined) (Vanek et al. 2014). Informal employment outside of the informal sector 
represents just 14 per cent of total informal employment. Roughly one-third of informal 
employment is waged employment and two-thirds self-employment (Vanek et al. 2014). The 
informal sector typically absorbs more vulnerable groups of workers into employment, 
including women and youth. In sub-Saharan Africa, 74 per cent of employed women, for 
example, find themselves in informal employment relative to 61 per cent of men (Vanek et al. 
2014).  
 
Cross-country comparisons are constrained by the availability of comparable data and, in the 
area of informality, this is a significant problem. Within Africa, the extent to which the ILO 
‘dual-component’ definition, which measures both the informal sector and informal 
employment, is employed in national labour market analyses varies. This can be seen clearly 
in Table 1 provided in Appendix A to this report. In some countries, such as Botswana, 
Lesotho and Tanzania, informality is defined based purely on the characteristics of the 
production units, while other countries apply an extended definition that takes into account 
informal employment relationships. It is also clear that the exact manner in which statistical 
agencies define the informal sector or informality can vary significantly. For instance, when 
defining the informal sector, some countries only look at registration of enterprise criteria, 
while others look at multiple criteria, including size of the enterprise, or whether the accounts 
of the enterprise are separate to those of the owner. Informal employment, though, is defined 
using a large and varying array of criteria across countries. This problem is, however, not 
unique to sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Despite this, international comparisons are attempted as a matter of course. Figure 1ignores 
these definitional issues and presents estimates of informal sector employment as a share of 
non-agricultural employment in low- and middle-income countries for which data exists. 
Significant variation can be observed in the extent of informality globally. Data for either 
measure exists for just 11 African countries. Within the region, informality is least widespread 
                                               
1  It is worth reiterating the difference between the informal sector and informal employment here. The former refers 
specifically to the nature of the enterprise, whereas the latter refers more to the protections enjoyed by workers. Vanek 
et al. (2014) describe informal employment as ‘all employment arrangements that leave individuals without social 
protection through their work, whether or not the economic units they operate or work for are formal enterprises, 
informal enterprises or households’ Thus, it is possible to be informally employed within the formal sector. 
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in Mauritius and South Africa, and most prevalent in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. In comparison, 
the range is substantially narrower within Latin America. 
 
The informal sector is a significant source of production and employment in African countries: 
it is estimated to account for about 55 per cent of total GDP in sub-Saharan Africa and to 
employ 80 per cent of the workforce (AfDB 2013). Given limited work opportunities in the 
formal sector, the informal sector represents a crucial avenue of economic participation for 
the most vulnerable segments of the population including the poor, women and youth. 
However, a commonly held view is that if economic growth is not associated with better 
employment opportunities or an improvement in the conditions of employment in informal 
activities, then the impact of growth on poverty and inequality will be minimal (ILO 2009).  
 
3.1 Informality as an alternative to unemployment 
 
Unemployment rates in low-income sub-Saharan Africa countries such as Liberia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Uganda are fairly low (Figure 2). Unemployment tends to be higher 
in middle-income sub-Saharan Africa countries (Golub and Hayat 2014), such as South 
Africa where unemployment is far higher at 25 per cent. In lower income countries, however, 
Fields (2012) suggests that unemployment is not an option for the poor and unskilled, who 
are often self-employed in subsistence agriculture or in the urban informal sector. In 2012, 
according to the ILO, own-account workers2 made up more than half of all workers in 
Zambia, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania (ILOSTAT 2015). 
 
In a number of SSA countries, rural-urban migration has resulted in the expansion of the 
urban informal sector because growth amongst the formal private and public sectors in urban 
areas is limited. Migration of rural dwellers to urban areas can be explained by the Harris-
Todaro model (1970), which assumes that the decision to migrate is based on expected 
income differentials between rural and urban areas. This means that even where urban 
unemployment is high, rural-urban migration can be economically rational if expected urban 
income is greater than rural income. Benjamin and Mbaye (2014) suggest that key reasons 
behind African rural-urban migration patterns are the desire to gain better access to public 
services and higher income generating opportunities. 
 
More opportunities within the informal sector 
Existing literature identifies two main reasons for the preference of informal employment over 
unemployment. Firstly, for many Africans informal employment represents the only option to 
generate an income in the face of significantly limited alternatives. Household surveys 
carried out in Tanzania and the Republic of Congo, for example, reported thatthe primary 
reason for entering the informal sectorwas difficulties in finding wage employment (Benjamin 
and Mbaye 2014). Golub and Hayat (2014) highlight limited demand for labour in Africa, 
particularly in countries that have failed to diversify their industrial sectors or absorb low-
skilled workers into higher value-added activities. In sub-Saharan Africa, about 20 per cent of 
exports are classified as industrial but most of these are in fact modestly processed primary 
products (Gelb 2009). Of total industrial exports, barely a quarter are true manufactured 
goods, and the two major categories—automotive products from South Africa and clothing 
exports from low-income countries—are supported by incentive programmes (Gelb 2009; 
IMF 2007). The industrial sector has only created a limited amount of employment, leaving 
the informal sector as one of the only options in which to earn a living. What is more, a 
comprehensive review of African employment trends by Fox and Oviedo (2013) found very 
low levels of wage employment in 2005 across all sectors, typically only about 10 to 15 per 
                                               
2  Own-account workers are those workers who, working on their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type 
of job defined as a ‘self- employment job’ … and have not engaged on a continuous basis any ‘employees’ to work for 
them during the reference period (ILO 1993). 
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cent of the total labour force. In South Africa, Lund (1998) finds that the informal sector in 
Durban offers employment to unskilled women who would not easily find a job elsewhere. 
Dinkelman and Ranchod (2007) further support the hypothesis that informal employment is 
the only option of employment for vulnerable groups in South Africa.  
 
Informal employment also predominates in the retail sector across sub-Saharan Africa. In 
South Africa, for example, the informal retails sector exists in townships and informal 
settlements. These localities exist because of apartheid policies that enforced spatial 
segregation and resulted in the establishment of large informal settlements outside cities 
where vibrant markets developed. Ligthelm (2008) argues that the township retail sector is 
significant with firms involved in retail trade accounting for the largest share of informal 
enterprises in South Africa. Ligthelm (2008)also estimates that informal retail outlets in 
townships accounted for 10 per cent of total retail trade in South Africa in 2003 
(approximately 30 billion Rand3), 2.7 per cent of which is derived from spaza shops, retail 
businesses operated from within homes (Ligthelm 2005). 
 
A range of retail firms operate in township economies increasing in sophistication from 
hawkers (street vendors) to spaza shops to general dealers (Ligthelm 2004). On average, 
township retailers employ 2.5 workers, and this average increases with the sophistication of 
the retail outlet. Using a national survey with a sample of 481 informal retailers in 
2003, Ligthelm (2004) identified the characteristics of these three types of retail outlet. He 
found that the level of education of the owner correlated with the sophistication of the retail 
outlet, with hawkers having the lowest average levels of education and general dealers the 
highest. The primary motivation prior to start-up is unemployment, suggesting that most of 
these business owners can be viewed as necessity entrepreneurs. On the other hand, 
unemployment was less of a driving factor amongst general dealers. Furthermore, Lighthelm 
identified evidence of an emerging entrepreneurial culture among this group, with 35.8 per 
cent of general dealers stating their reason for start-up as taking over the family business.  
 
Household enterprises or home-based enterprises (HBE) also represent an important 
component of informal economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa. Within the region, 40 per 
cent of households rely on HBEs as a source of income and these enterprises account for a 
significant share of non-agricultural employment (Fox and Sohnesen 2012). HBEs are also 
relatively common in South Africa’s townships where they are considered an important 
source of employment and income, particularly for poorer households (Gough et al. 2003; 
Tipple 2005; Ligthelm 2005). The defining feature of HBEs is the location of the business 
activity, which, as the name suggests, occurs at the residence of the owner or business 
partner rather than in a commercial or industrial building or area (Tipple 2005). HBEs 
comprise a diversity of business activities such as retail of basic foodstuff, clothing, take-
away food, mechanics, carpentry and hairdressing. 
 
The extent to which HBEs can be studied is limited by the availability of data and the informal 
nature of these enterprises. Studies focusing on HBEs typically employ micro-datasets 
limited to specific locations and thus the extent to which their findings can be interpreted and 
applied to a national context is limited. Fox and Sohnesen (2012) analyse data for six African 
countries—Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda—and find 
that household enterprises are associated with an increase in consumption of between 11 
per cent and 27 per cent in urban areas and as much as 32 per cent in rural areas. They 
conclude that ‘while [non-agricultural household enterprises] may be the occupational choice 
of people excluded from wage income opportunities (either because of lack of education or 
simply lack of labour demand), they are a good income choice for many members of this 
group, and for their households.’  
                                               
3  The current exchange rate is approximately US$1 = R14. 
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Gough et al. (2003) and Tipple (2005) analyse datasets from surveys carried out in urban 
settlements close to major cities (including Mamelodi in Pretoria, South Africa; Madina in 
Accra, Ghana; three neighbourhoods in Cochabamba, Bolivia; Banyu Urip in Surabaya, 
Indonesia; and Bhumeeheen Camp in New Delhi, India)4. Both studies found that HBEs are 
common in Mamelodi township where they can be found operating in approximately 40 per 
cent of households. Compared with the sampled urban settlements in Latin America and 
Asia, the frequency of HBEs across households is at least 10 percentage points higher in 
Mamelodi. This may point to the relative importance of such enterprises in the South African 
context, in terms of providing a source of employment and an avenue out of poverty. 
Alternatively, this difference could represent the concentration of HBEs in South African 
urban settlements due to the historical legacy of apartheid policy which prevented these 
enterprises from operate outside of the townships. 
 
Gough et al. (2003) argue that HBEs are an important source of income generation for the 
vulnerable and play a vital role in poverty alleviation at the household level. In fact, HBEs 
were found to generate 70 per cent of total household income. Gough et al. argue further 
that, even though the incomes generated by HBEs are low, they can play an important role in 
lifting the household out of poverty. Examining a sample across four urban settlements from 
four countries, Tipple (2005) finds that poverty is more common amongst non-HBE 
households. Furthermore, HBEs can play a vital role in providing an opportunity for women to 
engage in economic activity since combining productive and reproductive roles is more easily 
done at home (Gough et al. 2003). In Mamelodi, 73 per cent of HBEs are run by women 
(Gough et al. 2003). 
 
Informality as a buffer to unemployment 
The second reason for the predominance of informal employment in sub-Saharan Africa 
relates to the key role played by this sector in absorbing labour as part of the business cycle. 
Under this scenario, informality provides an alternative to unemployment, particularly during 
economic downturns and for vulnerable groups. In fact, individuals are often better off in 
informal employment than in unemployment, particularly if unemployment benefits (or any 
other type of transfer that might ‘favour’ unemployment over informality) are low or non-
existent. This was found to be the case in Zimbabwe in the 1990s when the number of small 
enterprises rose due to an economic slowdown (Daniels 2003). At the time, the informal 
sector grew as agricultural income declined. In addition, it has been shown across a number 
of East African countries that shocks to crop production result in an increase in self-
employment and casual labour (Otsuka and Yamano 2006). In Senegal, the informal sector 
absorbed a significant proportion of the workforce that was lost from the industrial sector 
between 1994 and 2001(Lindauer and Velenchik 2002). In South Africa, however, Bargain 
and Kwenda (2010) find that the wage gap between formal and informal employment is pro-
cyclical; a relationship that appears to be confirmed by a drop in informality after the recent 
recession in 2009. This finding contrasts the idea that formal sector wages are less sensitive 
to market forces because of labour market regulations like minimum wages. 
 
The question of the pro- or counter-cyclicality of the informal sector should perhaps not be 
considered relative to economic growth, but should rather be evaluated within the context of 
trends in formal sector employment and unemployment. This begs the questions, ‘What 
happens to informal sector employment when formal sector employment declines in 
response to economic downturn?’ as opposed to ‘What happens to informal sector 
employment when output contracts?’ While these questions are linked, they differ in a 
temporal sense; output contractions may precede or coincide with employment contractions, 
                                               
4  Both Gough et al. (2003) and Tipple (2005) analyse the same survey dataset on HBEs in Mamelodi. 
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depending on the labour market and, as a result, counter-cyclicality with respect to economic 
growth may differ from counter-cyclicality with respect to unemployment, for example. 
 
Whilst informal employment may be the only option in urban areas in the face of economic 
downturns, the main question that arises from the above-mentioned hypothesis is whether 
these workers are better off, either than the unemployed or than those who are 
underemployed mainly in subsistence agriculture. Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa 
suggests that average informal sector incomes are higher than those in subsistence 
agriculture (Fox and Gaal 2008), but wages are lower than those in the formal sector (ILO 
2002). In addition, workers in the informal sector are more likely to have received some sort 
of formal training relative to those in agriculture (Sparks and Barnett 2010). Further, urban 
areas often provide access to apprenticeships that are not available in rural areas (Filipiak 
2007). We therefore find that informal employment promotes inclusive growth by offering 
opportunities to interact with the economy; informal employment provides the unemployed 
with a source of income and, consequently, represents an instrument for poverty alleviation.  
 
3.2 The impact of informality on growth and jobs in the formal sector 
 
Within the context of inclusive growth, there are four channels through which we consider 
that informality could potentially have a negative impact. First, informal sector employment 
does not compare favourably with formal sector employment with respect to income, benefits 
and security. Second, productivity in the informal sector is lower than that in the formal 
sector, ceteris paribus. Third, the informal sector represents an erosion of the tax base, while 
at the same time ‘free-riding’ on publicly provided services. Fourth, informal sector firms may 
have an unfair competitive advantage over formal sector firms and may therefore undermine 
the ability of the formal sector to grow. 
 
The informal sector offers lower income, benefits and security 
Benefits of being employed in the formal sector include higher wages, increased access to 
welfare and health services (if they are not universal) (ILO 2009), work stability and access to 
credit. There is a clear welfare and wage disparity between workers in the formal and 
informal sectors. According to the ILO (2009), the average wage of informal sector workers in 
Africa is just one-fifth of that of their public sector counterparts. Kingdon and Knight (2007) 
find that formal sector wages and benefits in South Africa are far greater than in the informal 
sector. Also in South Africa, Bargain and Kwenda (2010) estimate that informal sector 
employees earn 62 per cent less than formal sector workers, while the self-employed earn30 
per cent less. 
 
Table 2 presents mean and median wages levels in the formal and informal sectors in 
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. The data confirms that median wages in the 
informal sector are significantly lower than those within the formal sector and that, within the 
informal sector, wages tend to be higher for non-agricultural workers. Using data for Cotonou 
(Benin), Dakar (Senegal) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Benjamin and Mbaye (2012) 
find that the formal sector wage distribution lies towards the right of that of the informal 
sector, implying higher wages, with the distribution for smaller informal firms to the left of that 
for large informal firms. They also find higher poverty rates among households whose heads 
are employed in the informal sector in Benin and Burkina Faso (Benjamin and Mbaye 2012). 
With higher incomes, formal sector workers are less likely to be poor and are better able to 
deal with economic shocks. 
 
According to the ILO (2009), worker in the informal economy, particularly women, are 
exposed to hazardous jobs and are at high risk of accident given lack of compliance with 
occupational health and safety regulations. Further, access to benefits is rare in the informal 
sector and women without maternity leave are particularly vulnerable to health complications 
(ILO 2009). Recognising the role of the informal sector in providing income to low-skilled 
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workers in particular, it is important to note that a large number of workers in the informal 
sector are underemployed, while others work long hours in low-productivity activities in which 
earnings are extremely low. 
 
Productivity differentials 
The productivity differential between the formal and informal sector is profound. La Porta and 
Shleifer (2008) use data for a number of African, Latin American and Asian countries from 
three World Bank surveys (the Enterprise Survey, the Informal Survey, and the Micro 
Survey) to estimate productivity as log value added, log sales per employee and log real 
output per employee. They find that registered firms are typically more productive than 
unregistered firms; that even small registered firms are more productive than unregistered 
firms; and that large unregistered firms are significantly more productive than small 
unregistered firms. For the African countries in their sample, they find that the ratio of value 
added by informal firms to that by formal firms ranged from one per cent in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and three per cent in Rwanda, to 10 per cent in Kenya, 14 per cent in 
Botswana (the median for the region) and 70 per cent in Cape Verde (La Porta and Shleifer 
2014). 
 
These productivity differentials at the micro-level are often evident at the macro-level: 
countries with high levels of informality typically have lower income levels. It is for this reason 
that the OECD (2006) argues that ‘while informal enterprises may provide a short-term 
solution to a household’s livelihood needs, creating an economy with a higher proportion of 
formal enterprises and jobs is important to long-term welfare creation, stability and poverty 
reduction’. Figure 3 presents data on the relationship between informal employment and per 
capita GDP in developing countries and confirms a negative correlation between informality 
and national income levels. This negative relationship is also found by La Porta and Shleifer 
(2008), using a range of measures of the informal economy, including contribution to GDP, 
prevalence of tax evasion and share of self-employment. Amongst the African countries 
included in Figure 3, countries such as Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia have high levels of 
informal employment and low per capita GDP. There are, though, outliers: Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe have somewhat lower levels of informal employment than would be expected 
given their per capita GDP levels. In the case of Zimbabwe, this may be related to the 
broader economic challenges experienced during the 2000s, while in Lesotho lower levels of 
informality may be related to that country’s interconnectedness with the South African 
economy. 
 
In terms of output, sub-Saharan Africa output per worker was found to be 13 times lower 
than the developed country average and one-quarter of the global average in 2007 (ILO 
2009). Loayza and Rigolini (2006) find that, in the long run, informality is more common in 
countries that have lower GDP per capita and impose more costs on formal firms in the form 
of more rigid business regulations, less valuable police and justice services, and weaker 
monitoring of informality. Formality also helps insulate firms from corruption and improves 
their access to credit (Caro et al. 2010), and enables them to access other business services 
provided by the state, such as contract and law enforcement. 
 
Likewise, countries with higher poverty levels tend to have higher levels of informality (Figure 
4). According to the ILO (2009), women represent the main financial support for 30 per cent 
of the world’s households and, since women are over-represented within informal sector 
employment, decent working conditions and remuneration have a significant role to play in 
broader developmental objectives related to poverty reduction and child welfare. 
 
At least part of the productivity advantage that formal sector firms enjoy may relate to the 
economies of scale that they are able to achieve since they do not need to remain small to 
avoid detection by authorities. However, Amin and Islam (2015) find that, within the informal 
sector, it is not necessarily the case that size is positively correlated with productivity. Using 
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the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys for Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Mali and Rwanda, they find a robust negative relationship between employment and 
labour productivity: a one per cent increase in employment is associated with a decline in 
labour productivity of between 0.4 and 0.6 per cent, depending on the exact specification. 
This, the authors argue, ‘may indicate that there may be small informal firms that do not have 
any incentive to grow’’ (Amin and Islam 2015). 
 
Erosion of tax base 
By definition, informal sector activity occurs beyond the view of authorities. The prevalence of 
informal activities is closely related to an environment characterised by weaknesses in three 
institutional areas, namely taxation, regulation and private property rights (AfDB 2013). A 
large informal sector uses and congests public infrastructure without contributing tax revenue 
to finance it. As a result, service quality and quantity is lowered, while putting upward 
pressure on taxes paid by the formal sector.  
 
Within the sub-Saharan Africa region, though, it is not clear to what extent the erosion of the 
tax base is currently a serious concern, with relatively little research aimed at quantifying 
these lost revenues. One such study, by Benjamin and Mbaye (2012), estimates that 
collecting income tax from informal sector businesses would raise an additional 10.6 per cent 
of GDP in tax receipts in Benin, 4.9 per cent in Burkina Faso and 2.9 per cent in Senegal. 
Thus, the extent of these lost revenues is likely to vary widely across countries. The key 
question then is whether these are truly ‘lost’ revenues in the sense that they could be 
recovered with sufficient effort. We would argue that it is unlikely that tax authorities would be 
able to collect a significant proportion of these revenues, given the institutional weaknesses 
that plague many countries in the region, the particular complexities associated with taxing 
the informal sector and the social and political ramifications of trying to tax the sector. 
Indeed, such a tax collection effort may have significant negative effects on activity within the 
sector, further compromising employment and poverty outcomes. That said, these foregone 
revenues are a real concern in many Latin American countries, for example, where 
informality predominates and their example should certainly serve as a cautionary tale for 
policymakers who advocate for expanding the informal sector. 
 
The flipside of the ‘lost revenue’ argument is that should taxes be collected from the informal 
sector, the onus then shifts firmly to the public sector in terms of basic service and 
infrastructure provision. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the presence of a large informal 
sector is likely to have negative implications for state capacity and the role of the state 
relative to what might be the case were the sector smaller. 
 
Formal-informal linkages 
The various advantages inherent in formality from the perspective of workers can often 
represent disadvantages from the perspective of firms, when compared to informal sector 
firms. Formal firms have higher wage costs and are less flexible (Almeida and Carneiro 
2005). Thus, formal sector firms may face significant competition in the form of informal firms 
with their lower cost structures (OECD 2009). As La Porta and Shleifer (2014) note, this view 
of ‘informal firms as parasites competing unfairly with law-abiding formal firms’’ implies that 
‘informality should be suppressed, not unleashed’’. 
 
Dinh et al. (2012) investigate binding constraints on the growth of firms in 98 developing 
countries using World Bank Enterprise Survey data, which includes responses from more 
than 39,000 firms. Firms are asked to rate 15 obstacles related to the business environment, 
one of which is ‘practices of competitors in the informal sector’. Using a number of different 
models with firm-level employment growth as the dependent variable, the authors find that 
informal sector competition is second only to access to finance as a binding constraint: it 
consistently has a negative, statistically significant coefficient irrespective of the particular 
model or subgroup of countries (of which sub-Saharan Africa is one). Further, these results 
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are found to be robust when excluding foreign firms, government-owned firms or non-
exporting firms. In total, 38 sub-Saharan African countries were included in this analysis, 
using data collected between 2006 and 2009. Of these, informal sector competition was the 
most cited constraint amongst firms in four countries—Cameroon (24.9 per cent of firms), 
Cape Verde (17.1 per cent), Niger (21.2 per cent) and Swaziland (25.4 per cent)—and as the 
second-most cited constraint in a further six countries (Botswana, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique and Zambia) (Dinh et al. 2012). In Benin, Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Malawi, Togo and Uganda, informal sector competition was the third-most cited constraint. 
Thus, firms in 16 out of 38 sub-Saharan African countries rated informal sector competition 
within the top three constraints. 
 
Competitive advantages for informal firms are not, though, solely related to their ability to 
avoid the costs associated with formality. The success of informal retailers in South African 
townships, for example, is related to their close proximity to their customers; the convenience 
they offer in terms of longer trading hours; and their willingness to sell smaller quantities of 
certain items (Ligthelm 2008). Ligthelm (2005 and 2008) argues that their ability and 
willingness to extend credit to their customers represents a key advantage for informal 
township retailers: 81.7 per cent of these firms offer credit to their regular customers, few of 
whom would likely be able to access credit lines with formal retailers (Ligthelm 2005). 
 
At the same time, however, there is an argument to be made that it is formal sector firms that 
hold the upper hand. In South Africa, for example, it is argued that the high degree of 
concentration of the formal sector and its reach into rural and informal urban settlements is 
one of the factors underlying the weakness of the informal sector. The impact of increased 
competition from formal sector retailers entering townships through new shopping centres on 
informal township retailers is analysed by Ligthelm (2008). This trend is found to be driven by 
rising incomes within townships and the desire of formal sector firms to tap into this market. 
Analysing data from a survey of 100 small informal and formal retail businesses in 
Soshanguve, a township near Pretoria, Ligthelm (2008) finds evidence of a declining market 
share for smaller and informal township retailers. Despite formal sector competition, informal 
retailers in South African townships exhibit a number of encouraging features. In an analysis 
of 360 spaza retailers across a number of townships in 2001, Ligthelm (2005) finds that two 
out of five owners would not choose a formal sector job if offered, which suggests a degree 
of success and permanence of their business. 
 
Despite competition between the formal and informal sector, it is important to acknowledge 
the linkages between the two. Ligthelm (2004, 2005), for example, finds evidence of 
increasing linkages between the sectors in South Africa, evidenced by supplier relationships 
from formal suppliers to township retailers. This, it is argued, is the result of the recognition 
by formal wholesalers of the informal sector as a key channel to the township consumer 
(Ligthelm 2004). Similarly, Böhme and Thiele (2012) investigate formal-informal linkages in 
the economic capitals of six West African countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo. They find that while informal goods are almost exclusively sold through 
informal distribution channels, the majority of household expenditure on formal goods also 
occurs through informal distribution channels (with spending on formal goods through 
informal distribution channels typically outweighing spending on formal goods through formal 
distribution channels by a factor of roughly two to one) (Böhme and Thiele 2012). Paralleling 
the South African experience, Böhme and Thiele (2012) point to the potentially negative 
impact of (formal) supermarkets on the livelihoods of informal households as they limit the 
available options. 
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3.3 Facilitating transitions from unemployment to informal employment and 
from informality to formality 
 
While the focus of the previous two sections was on contextualising and conceptualising the 
relationship between informality and inclusive growth, this section reviews public policies and 
interventions that impact the transition of informal sector firms or own account workers into 
the formal sector. We consider two types of interventions in various contexts. Firstly, we 
consider the case in which policies have not had the desired outcome of increased 
formalisation. Secondly, we consider the case in which, instead of formalisation policies, 
other interventions that deal with the external constraints on micro-enterprises are used to 
facilitate growth and sustainability of formal sector micro-enterprises. Regulatory and 
institutional barriers increase the costs associated with formalisation, discouraging micro-
enterprises from attempting to enter the formal economy. Furthermore, in a number of 
African countries certain institutions, including those that uphold property rights and facilitate 
access to credit, are either weak or do not exist (Benjamin and Mbaye 2014). This means 
that there is less benefit and a greater cost to entering the formal sector. To some extent, this 
explains why the informal sector is as large as it is in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Spiegel (2012) examines formalisation policies that targeted Zimbabwe’s small-scale 
informal mining sector in the 1990s. The Government of Zimbabwe took an interest in 
supporting small-scale miners in 1990, legalising riverbed mining in 1991 and decentralising 
the issuing of licences to local government. In addition, community mineral processing 
centres were created but there were too few relative to the amount of artisanal miners, 
resulting in significant backlogs. Nevertheless, income of artisanal miners rose and thus the 
legislative amendments were seen as a positive move by the government. Whilst there were 
significant positive steps were made through various initiatives between 1990 and 2005, 
serious managerial deficits amongst the mineral processing centres persisted. In order to 
deal with the backlog, the government set a minimum amount of ore that could be brought to 
the processing centres, which essentially excluded a number of small-scale producers. 
Overall, the policy reform was felt to support wealthier and more organised small scale-
producers. However in 2006, as inflation began to rise, the government reverted back to 
older policies and made riverbed gold mining illegal once again. This resulted in a number of 
small-scale miners that continued mining being given significant prison sentences. Thus the 
government went from breaking down external constraints to once again building them up, 
moving the emphasis from empowerment of the poor to formalisation of mining.  
 
This case suggests that transitions to formality can be threatened by exposing the informal 
sector to ill-conceived (or predatory) state policies that crowd out small producers and 
promote the political interests of government officials rather than market efficiency. This is 
one example in which formalisation policies have been used to justify heavy-handed law 
enforcement campaigns that have resulted in insecure livelihoods for a number of small-
scale producers (Spiegel 2012). 
 
Indeed, the costs of enforcing formality may outweigh the benefits depending on the context 
in which the firm operates. A recent set of studies by Charman et al. (2013) and Charman et 
al. (2014) shed light on the impacts of public policy directed at enforcing formality within a 
sub-sector of South African retail firms, namely liquor retailers (known locally as shebeens). 
Four key findings emerge from this analysis. Firstly, there are a significant number of 
shebeens across all the sites investigated: of 818 micro-enterprises in the area, 117 sold 
liquor. Secondly, the notion of firm heterogeneity is consistent even within this sub-sector of 
liquor selling firms since shebeens were found to vary in terms of location, size in terms of 
volume of sales, and gender of owner by volume of sales. Thirdly, there are strong linkages 
not only between formal sector liquor wholesalers and shebeens, but also between shebeens 
and local enterprises within the township. 
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The final two key findings relate to the impact of enforcement on this type of informal micro-
enterprise. Firstly, there is a clear discontinuity between the policy of formalising this type of 
enterprise and the economic reality of these firms. For instance, the spatial analysis reveals 
that although some shebeens are located along the ‘high street’, the majority (77 per cent) 
are distributed evenly across residential areas (this spatial distribution is evident across firm 
types)5. The implication is that despite efforts to enforce the registration and licensing of 
these businesses, the majority of these businesses would still be considered illegal due to 
their location within a residential area. However, a key component of the micro-enterprise 
business model in townships is that they meet localised demand from consumers within their 
vicinity. Therefore, enforcement would disrupt an existing economy that is tailored to its 
unique environment. Secondly, Charman et al. (2013) find that enforcement is not having the 
desired effect: only a very small share of shebeens (11 per cent) migrated to the formal 
system. The majority remained informal and have developed new strategies to better evade 
law enforcement. Charman et al. (2013) find that many of these entrepreneurs are poor and 
that their business is their livelihood. As the costs of formalising outweigh the benefits, they 
are left with little choice but to continue operating and incorporating the costs of evading 
enforcement into their business model. Charman et al. (2013) argue that the policy of 
formalising these informal micro-enterprises is at odds with the economic reality of high 
unemployment and the fact that these firms function as a key part of the economic structure 
of these township economies.  
 
As evident in the cases described above, there is a substantial knowledge of the 
characteristics of informal micro-enterprises in township economies. The analysis by 
Charman and Petersen (2014) indicates that micro-enterprises are distributed evenly across 
townships and that they typically serve small, localised markets (Gough et al. 2003; Ligthelm 
2004). However, very little is known about why these enterprises remain small and informal 
(Charman et al. 2013). Do they remain small and informal because they are economically 
constrained (e.g. access to credit) or geographically constrained? Does the nature of the 
business, the consumer base and the owner’s motivation restrict them? Is it a combination of 
the above as well as other factors? From a policy standpoint, which typically focuses on 
‘graduating’ these enterprises into the formal sector, these questions are important. 
 
Where the informal sector is pervasive, enforcing formality becomes difficult, particularly 
when institutions are weak. However, there are examples of firms that move organically into 
the formal sector as they grow. Sonobe et al. (2011), in a study on metalworkers in Kenya, 
find that businesses organically move into the formal sector when they outgrow the informal 
sector, in part because their place of business has become too congested for them to grow. 
In addition, they find that being formal facilitates marketing and growth, which improves their 
competitive standing, given the number of small firms in this sector. They also find that as 
new firms enter the market, education or knowledge of the owner of the business becomes 
an important determinant of firm performance, as they understand management strategies 
and risks related to profit generation. In this case in Kenya, the government did not provide 
any support for the informal businesses besides a space in which to operate.  
 
Based on a study of seven West African countries, Grimm et al. (2012) suggest that firms 
suffering from external constraints as opposed to internal constraints are far more likely to 
grow and even formalise. External constraints are linked to the external environment and 
include access to finance, to a fixed business location and to basic infrastructure. Internal 
constraints, on the other hand, have to do with the skills of those within the enterprise. 
External constraints are supposedly not binding and can be dealt with through various 
                                               
5  This is a key finding across the broader research project on informal enterprises in townships in the Western Cape and 
Gauteng. See Charman and Petersen (2014). 
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interventions in the short term. However, survivalist firms6 face both external and internal 
constraints and policy interventions addressing the external environment are likely to have a 
weaker impact on this group. 
 
In East Africa, innovations such as M-Pesa (mobile money transfer), access to online 
platforms and e-services have had a positive impact on micro-enterprises. These are 
examples of policy interventions targeting external constraints faced by informal firms. 
Frederick (2014) examined the relationship between mobile money transfer and profits of 
micro-enterprises in Zambia and found evidence of substantial positive net marginal benefits 
for micro-enterprises using mobile money. Mbogo (2010) undertook an analysis of the usage 
of M-Pesa by micro-enterprises in Kenya, the majority of which, it was argued, were informal. 
It was found that the convenience of the money transfer technology, its accessibility, lower 
cost relative to other structures, security and usage services enhance the success and 
growth of micro-enterprises. While services such as these may result in a business growing 
and becoming more profitable, it does not necessarily mean that the business will enter into 
the formal sector. However, the positive impact on income suggests that businesses become 
more sustainable and likely to survive, thereby promoting inclusive growth.  
 
While the case studies presented here are contextually very different, there are several 
lessons that can be drawn. Firstly, there is a lack of information regarding the heterogeneity 
of the informal sector and policy interventions do not always account for this. Survivalist 
enterprises require different policy interventions to firms with fewer internal constraints. Firms 
with internal constraints require interventions that target skills and basic managerial 
practices. Micro-enterprises with only external constraints require policy interventions that 
facilitate doing business in the firm’s environment. Secondly, formalisation policies seem to 
favour small businesses that are more successful and in a better position to exploit such 
interventions. Formalisation requires that firms incur a number of costs that are often more 
affordable for firms that are better off. Thus, policy-makers should recognise that firms at 
different stages of development will formalise at different rates. Enforcing formalization may 
have more detrimental effects on welfare if it forces firms out of the market. Thirdly, policies 
need not always target formalization through regulation, as certain firms will outgrow the 
informal sector organically. In order to facilitate this, skills training, access to credit, a space 
in which to do business and a reliable energy source may allow businesses to flourish and 
expand into formal markets. Lastly, the scope and scale of informal micro-enterprises will 
continue to grow across most developing countries despite regulatory reform (Sinha and 
Kanbur 2012). However, Charman et al. (2013) argue that the reasons behind the growth of 
the informal economy and the increased emergence of micro-enterprises are poorly 
understood. As such, future research needs to interrogate the factors driving or facilitating 
entry into the informal sector, whether as an employee or as a business owner. In the 
following section, we explore one of these potential factors, namely the impact of a positive 
income shock in the form of a welfare grant on the labour market behaviour of household 
members.  
 
The literature and broader evidence presented here suggest a number of key findings in 
terms of the relationship between the informal sector and inclusive growth. Firstly, the 
informal sector promotes inclusive growth through providing an alternative to unemployment 
when there are no alternative employment opportunities available, particularly for those with 
low skills as well as women and young people. Secondly, the informal sector may inhibit 
                                               
6  Survivalist enterprises are low productivity enterprises that are typically not skill-intensive, do not employ additional 
workers and from which only survival levels of income are generated. Rogerson (1997) describes survivalist enterprises 
as ‘a set of activities undertaken by people unable to secure regular wage employment or access to an economic sector 
of their choice. Generally speaking, the incomes generated from these enterprises … usually fall short of even a 
minimum income standard and involve little capital investment, virtually no skills training, and only constrained 
opportunities for expansion into a viable business. Overall, poverty and the desperate attempt to survive are the prime 
defining features of these enterprises.’ 
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inclusive growth when workers are put in precarious positions where earning benefits are 
outweighed by job insecurity and lack of protection. Thirdly, the informal sector is a 
significant economic contributor that employs large majorities of individuals in a number of 
sub-Saharan Africa countries. Therefore, in order to promote inclusive growth, policymakers 
should be careful not to create policies that push firms out of the market and as a result 
increase levels of household poverty. Policymakers should take into account the 
heterogeneity of informal sector actors. Approaches that consider more integrated markets 
often emphasise the relationship between informality and inclusive growth, but often 
‘recognise that informality is a better option than a fully formal but inflexible economy that 
cannot bypass the distortions and rigidities induced by a burdensome regulatory system’ 
(Elbadawi and Loayza 2008). This may not be applicable to all countries in the region, but it 
does rebalance the discussion from the informality-formality dichotomy towards the 
recognition that unemployment is often an alternative scenario. 
 
 
4 Informality and inclusive growth in South 
Africa 
 
In this section, we turn our focus towards South Africa and aim to provide evidence relating 
to some of the issues raised in the previous section. In particular, we investigate the following 
questions in the case of South Africa. First, to what extent do formal and informal sector 
workers differ from each other (and from the unemployed and the economically inactive) in 
their observable characteristics? Is there evidence that suggests that the informal sector 
provides employment to individuals who are otherwise marginalised from employment and 
the economy generally? Second, how does informal sector employment react to changing 
economic conditions? Is informal sector employment pro- or counter-cyclical and what are 
the implications for the inclusiveness of economic growth? Third, how common are 
individual-level transitions into informal and formal sector employment and is there any 
evidence of obstacles to certain types of labour market transitions? Lastly, is there evidence 
suggesting that positive household income shocks, by addressing binding resource 
constraints, may be associated with increased informal sector participation? 
 
4.1 Observable characteristics of formal and informal workers 
 
In providing an overview of informality, we assess the extent to which those in informal 
employment differ from the rest of the working-age population according to their particular 
labour market status.Table 4 presents the distribution of a number of demographic and other 
covariates across six mutually exclusive labour force states—formal employee; formal self-
employed; informal employee; informal self-employed; searching unemployed; and non-
searching unemployed—as well as for those who are not economically active. The final 
column of the table gives the proportion of total employment accounted for by workers who 
are informally employed. The following section uses the terms ‘informal employment’ and 
‘informally employed’ as including both informal employees and the informally self-employed, 
similar for ‘formal employment’ and ‘formally employed’. 
 
Overall, formal employment is much more common than informal employment in South 
Africa, where 34.6 per cent of the workforce engages in the informal employment. Workers 
are most likely to be formal employees, followed by informal employees, with 27.3 and 11.5 
per cent of working-age individuals engaged in these activities respectively. Self-employment 
(whether formal or informal) is not common, although individuals of working age are more 
likely to be informally than formally self-employed.  
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It is clear from Table 4 that labour market status differs substantially across race groups in 
South Africa. Whites are more likely to be self-employed or employees in the formal sector 
and have the lowest overall rate of workers in informal employment (9.9 per cent). In 
contrast, Africans7 are least likely to be employed in any type of formal employment and 
have the highest rate of informal employment, with 39.4 per cent of all African workers 
informally employed. Therefore, not only do White South Africans experience the lowest 
unemployment rate, they are also more likely to be engaged in employment that is typically 
characterised by higher wages, greater job security and better-quality work conditions. 
Similarly, men are more likely than women to be engaged in formal employment, with 31.0 
per cent men and 38.9 per cent women in informal employment.  
 
Educational attainment is an important indicator of labour market status: a larger proportion 
of those with higher attainment is in formal employment. While 45.0 per cent of workers who 
did not complete secondary school are informally employed, this falls to 27.9 per cent if the 
worker completed secondary education. Tertiary education further reduces the likelihood of 
informal employment and substantial differences exist between individuals with 
diplomas/certificates and those who have obtained a degree. While only 13.6 per cent of 
diploma/certificate holders are informally employed, this decreases to just 3.2 for individuals 
with a degree.  
 
While the majority of youth aged 15 to 24 years are not economically active (NEA), 73.8 per 
cent of those youth who are working are employed informally. Informality levels are lower for 
all other age cohorts, indicating that youth are particularly exposed to this vulnerable form of 
employment. This may be due an emphasis on experience on the part of employers and an 
unwillingness to assume the additional risk associated with hiring individuals who are 
relatively ‘untested’ in the job market. Thus, young people may resort to informal employment 
as a last-resort if they find themselves unable to secure employment in the formal economy.  
 
Unsurprisingly, formal employment is most common in urban areas. Informal employment 
accounts for more than half (53.3 per cent) of employment in traditional rural areas, which 
are characterised by communally-owned villages and suffer from poor economic 
opportunities due to their isolation. The incidence of informal employment is somewhat lower 
in commercial farming areas, but remains high at 44.2 per cent. The sector of employment is 
also a strong indicator of the incidence of informal employment. For example, private 
household workers have the highest incidence of informal employment (85.5 per cent), 
followed by those in construction (66.5 per cent). The mining and financial sectors have high 
rates of formal employment, with only 2.0 per cent and 10.2 per cent respectively of workers 
informally employed.  
 
Finally, the mean and median hourly wages in formal and informal employment highlights the 
relative vulnerability of informal workers. Mean monthly wages are lower in both forms of 
informal employment, when compared with formal employment. The mean monthly wage for 
formal employees is R6,260 per month (just under USD450), compared with only R1,845 per 
month (around USD130) for informal employees. Similarly, the formally self-employed earn 
on average R20,237 per month (USD1,445), compared to just R1,684 (USD120) for the 
informally self-employed. These large wage differentials correspond with the large 
differentials found within the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) data presented in  
Table 3. 
                                               
7  The term ‘black African’ is used by government and Statistics South Africa, but is much less common in the economics 
literature. In South Africa, ‘black’ on its own is not equivalent to ‘African’ or ‘black African’; rather, ‘black’ is equivalent to 
‘not White’, although the latter term is not used due to racist connotations.  Socio-economic analysis in South Africa 
continues to rely on the apartheid-era racial classifications as a means of monitoring progress in addressing historical 
inequalities. This classification distinguishes between African (or Black African); Coloured (individuals of mixed ethnic 
ancestry); Asian (or Indian/Asian); and White.’ We use these latter definitions here. 
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These large wage differentials are echoed in differences in poverty measures by labour 
market status presented in Table 5. Here we calculate the standard P0 (poverty headcount) 
and P1 (poverty gap) measures proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) for all 
working-age adults aged 15 to 64 years using per capita household expenditure and two 
poverty lines. Irrespective of the poverty line or poverty measure used, the data confirms 
greater poverty amongst those that are not employed (i.e. unemployed or not economically 
active) compared with those that are employed (either formally or informally), and greater 
poverty amongst those who are informally employed compared with those that are formally 
employed. Thus, the data confirms higher levels of deprivation amongst those with weaker 
connections to the labour market: using the lower-bound poverty line, between 56 and 60 per 
cent of working-age adults who are not employed are poor, compared to between 37 and 45 
per cent of the informally employed, 17.5 per cent of formal employees and just 4.9 per cent 
of the formal self-employed. 
 
Importantly, these poverty differentials provide some evidence that South Africa’s 
unemployment insurance system is unlikely to be causing individuals to choose 
unemployment over, say, informal employment. This may be due in part to limitations in 
coverage, the relatively low benefit levels and the limited duration of benefits. In order to 
claim from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), workers must have accumulated 
sufficient credit. This means that coverage is limited to formal sector workers. Public sector 
workers, people who work less than 24 hours a month, and workers earning above a certain 
threshold are also excluded from UIF coverage. Benefits range between 38 per cent and 68 
per cent of average earnings over the final six months of employment and are paid up to a 
maximum of 238 days over a four-year period (Department of Labour 2014). 
 
This stark poverty ordering of labour market status does not, though, translate into an 
inequality ordering. In Table 6 we decompose overall labour earnings inequality according to 
labour market status, with labour earnings including wages and earnings from self-
employment, following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and Leibbrandt et al. (1996). Often this 
type of decomposition looks at income sources, but here we apply the decomposition to 
labour market status. The data reveals extremely high inequality in individual-level labour 
earnings, with a Gini coefficient of 0.697. This is, though, significantly higher than estimates 
of inequality within a given labour market status. Thus, for example, the Gini coefficient for 
informal employees’ wages is 0.476 rising to 0.578 for the formal self-employed; in general, 
inequality amongst the self-employed is higher than amongst employees. Formal employees, 
though, are responsible for the lion’s share of inequality in labour earnings in South Africa, 
accounting for 81.5 per cent of the value of the overall Gini coefficient. Informal employees 
and the informal self-employed account for under five per cent of total inequality. 
 
Overall, then, the data confirms significant differences in the observable characteristics of 
individuals across the various different labour market statuses. Individuals who are most 
often formal employees are White, male, between the ages of 25 years and 54 years, have 
at least 12 years of education and are located in urban areas. Those that are most often 
formal self-employed are White, aged between 55 and 64 years, and have tertiary education. 
Individuals most likely to be informal employees or informal self-employed are those with 
primary or no education, and aged between 25 and 54 years. Those that are most likely to be 
unemployed, whether searching or non-searching, are African, female, with less than 12 
years of education, and who are located in traditional rural areas. Informality rates are 
particularly high for Africans, women, those with fewer than twelve years of education, those 
under the age of 25 years, and those located in non-urban areas. These are all groups that 
experience labour market disadvantage and who typically experience higher rates of 
unemployment (DPRU 2013). 
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4.2 Employment and the business cycle 
 
As discussed, one of the key mechanisms through which informality may promote inclusive 
growth is through the ability of the informal sector to absorb the unemployed into 
employment. This is particularly important in the context of cyclicality in the labour market as 
employment responds to changing economic conditions. Our analysis here is constrained by 
two factors. First, due to a variety of reasons, there does not exist in South Africa a long-term 
series of employment data disaggregated by sector (formal/informal), with such data only 
having been systematically collected since the mid-1990s (regular, quarterly data is only 
available from 2008). Second, prior to the recession in early 2009, South Africa had not 
experienced negative real year-on-year economic growth rates in any quarter since the end 
of apartheid (own calculations; SARB, 2015), constraining our ability to analyse employment 
shifts during and after economic downturns. The current series of QLFS data goes back to 
2008 and we therefore have 30 quarters of labour market data available, which begins 
exactly one year before the economy entered recession. 
 
Figure 5 presents economic growth rates alongside changes in formal and informal 
employment in South Africa for the period since 2008. The first three panels plot employment 
growth for each sector—formal, informal, private households—and real GDP growth over 
time. The fourth panel (bottom right) plots actual employment changes in each of the three 
sectors for the same period. As noted, the recession that began in early 2009 was the first in 
the post-apartheid period and lasted throughout 2009. Despite a relatively strong rebound in 
growth rates during 2010, quarterly year-on-year GDP growth declined to around two per 
cent thereafter and has weakened further in the past 12 to 18 months. 
 
The labour market impact of the recession in the real economy is clearly evident. Year-on-
year, employment declined in each of the three sectors in the quarters during or immediately 
after the economic contraction. However, the data suggests that it was informal sector 
employment that contracted earliest: while informal sector employment was already strongly 
contracting in the first quarter of 2009, it was still only marginally negative in the formal sector 
in the following quarter. The bottom right panel confirms this, indicating that initial job losses 
during the recession were almost exclusively within the informal sector. In contrast, 
employment change in private households mimicked quite closely that in the formal sector. 
This is not particularly surprising given that these are primarily domestic workers who, given 
the wage differentials between the three sectors, are most likely to be employed by 
households with formal sector jobs. Despite this, informal sector employment growth 
recovered quickly and was positive by the second quarter of 2010. In contrast, formal sector 
employment only began growing again in the first quarter of 2011, while private household 
employment growth turned positive three quarters later. 
 
Correlation coefficients between employment and GDP change, shown in Table 7, provide 
interesting insights into the movement of these variables. First, the strong link between 
formal sector and private household employment is confirmed by the correlation coefficient of 
0.64. Second, there is only a low correlation between formal sector and informal sector 
employment (0.28) and no correlation between informal sector and private household 
employment (0.02). Third, the correlation between real GDP growth and informal sector 
employment growth is strong with a coefficient of 0.63, while that between real GDP growth 
and formal sector employment growth is relatively weak (0.28). This finding corresponds with 
the view that the informal sector is more flexible, as this sector reacts quickly to changing 
economic conditions by shedding or adding jobs rapidly. The weaker correlation for the 
formal sector is related to inflexibilities in the formal labour market, as firms delayed shedding 
labour either because of the regulatory requirements associated with retrenchments or 
because they prefer not to make cuts immediately. Indeed, the correlation coefficient 
between formal sector employment and lagged GDP growth (lagged by four quarters) is 
0.62, and -0.38 for informal sector employment. 
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Although this data covers a relatively short period of time and includes only one period of 
negative economic growth, it suggests a degree of pro-cyclicality in informal sector 
employment in South Africa since 2008. Informal sector employment reacts swiftly to 
changing economic circumstances in a way that the formal sector cannot: the recession saw 
rapid declines in informal sector employment, while the recovery of economic growth saw 
rapid increases in informal sector employment. In the aftermath of economic downturns, 
though, it is this flexibility that may help promote more inclusive growth by getting 
unemployed individuals (back) into the workforce during economic recoveries more quickly. 
 
4.3 Extent of labour market transitions into and out of (in)formality 
 
The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) panel enables the analysis of the extent of 
transitions into and out of formal and informal employment between 2008 (Wave 1) and 2012 
(Wave 3).8 The transition matrix provided in Table 8 presents transitions between labour 
market statuses and is augmented to include the overall percentage of working-age 
individuals in each state in 2008 and 2012 on the inside border of the matrix, with 2008 levels 
reported on the left and 2012 levels reported above the interior matrix. We include individuals 
who were between the ages of 15 and 64 years in 2008, and no restriction on age in 2012. 
The key constraint with transition matrices is that, although we have information on labour 
market status at two distinct points in time, we do not have information relating to the 
intervening period. This means that we are unable to detect multiple transitions during the 
period, which may be particularly challenging where transitions back and forth between two 
states may be common. As a result, the data presented are lower bound estimates of the 
extent of transitions in the South African labour market during the period.  
 
Overall, the proportion of the working-age population in formal employment rose between 
2008 and 2012, from 23.0 per cent to 29.9 per cent. This was accompanied by a decrease in 
the proportion of the working-age population in informal employment, rather than an increase 
in the overall level of employment in South Africa. As 2008 and 2012 can be viewed as pre- 
and post-recession, this indicates that the recession years may have facilitated a shift from 
informal to formal employment in South Africa. This is consistent with the data presented 
earlier in Figure 5 and is supported by Verick (2010) who found that, over a one-year period 
between 2008 and 2009, the informal sector accounted for 64 per cent of total job losses.  
 
Each row in the interior matrix of Table 8 shows the proportion of individuals in each state in 
2008 who found themselves in any given state in 2012. For example, the first row of the 
interior matrix indicates that, of all those individuals who were formal employees in 2008, 
74.0 per cent were still formal employees in 2012 while 10.2 per cent were not economically 
active. This indicates the relative ‘stickiness’ of the formal employee status compared with 
the other states, as nearly three-quarters of those who were formal employees in 2008 were 
still formal employees in 2012.  
 
Overall, both types of informal employment were more transient than formal employment 
between 2008 and 2012. Only 23.3 per cent and 20.1 per cent of those who were informal 
employees and informally self-employed in 2008 were still in these states in 2012. Of those 
individuals who were informal employees in 2008, 32.7 per cent were formal employees in 
2012. In addition, individuals in informal employment in 2008 were more likely than those in 
formal employment to be searching unemployed, discouraged (non-searching unemployed) 
or not economically active in 2012. The transition from informal to formal self-employment 
                                               
8  Ideally, labour market transitions would be analysed between 2008 and 2010 (Waves 1 and 2) and between 2010 and 
2012 (Waves 2 and 3). However, due to problems related to the labour market status variable in Wave 2, a decision 
was taken to analyse only the 2008-2012 transitions. For more detail on this issue, see Cichello et al. (2012). 
28 
 
was almost unheard of at just 1.8 per cent. Instead, the informal self-employed in 2008 were 
more likely to transition to inactivity in 2012 than to any other status.  
 
While 26.6 per cent of the searching unemployed in 2008 continued to actively seek work in 
2012, 21.1 per cent transitioned to the formal employee state. In terms of transitions to the 
informal sector between 2008 and 2012, 14.8 per cent of the unemployed transitioned to 
informal employee while just 5.2 per cent of individuals transitioned to informal self-
employment. A large proportion of the searching unemployed in 2008, however, were part of 
the not economically active population in 2012.   
 
These aggregate transitions hide important variations between different groups within the 
population. Specifically, we present the equivalent transition matrices for Africans9 (Table 9), 
males (Table 10) and females (Table 11); for youth (Table 12) and non-youth ( 
Table 13)10; and for the relatively less educated (Table 14) and the relatively better educated 
(Table 15). 
 
The transition matrix for Africans (Table 9) is similar to the aggregate table in terms of 
stickiness in the formal employee classification, with 73.3 per cent of Africans who were 
formal employees in 2008 remaining in this form of employment in 2012. Overall, the key 
difference between this table and the aggregate table is that Africans who are formally self-
employed in 2008 are less likely to remain in this state in 2012 (21.8 per cent compared to 
41.5 per cent on the aggregate level). The formally self-employed in 2008 are also more 
likely to be searching unemployed in 2012 (18.1 per cent compared with 9.9 per cent in the 
aggregate table). 
 
The transition matrices by gender (Table 10 and Table 11) are similar in the extent of 
stickiness in the formal employee classification, with roughly three-quarters of both men and 
women who were formal employees in 2008 remaining in the same state four years later. 
There are, however, some important differences between men and women. Men are 
generally more likely than women to transition into the formal employee status from other 
statuses over the period. Thus, 36.7 per cent of male informal employees transitioned to 
formal employee (28.8 per cent for women), while this was true of 15.2 per cent of informal 
self-employed men (7.9 per cent for women) and 30.5 per cent of searching unemployed 
men (16.5 per cent for women). Further evidence of men being more likely to transition 
‘upwards’ includes higher rates of transition from non-searching unemployment and 
economic inactivity to searching unemployment, and lower rates of transition into economic 
inactivity from all other statuses except formal self-employment. In contrast, women were 
more likely to transition ‘downwards’ from formal to informal self-employment (22.5 per cent 
of formal self-employed women compared with 15.3 per cent of their male counterparts). 
There is also a high degree of stickiness in female economic inactivity with three-fifths of 
inactive women in 2008 being inactive in 2012, while ten per cent of non-searching 
unemployed women in 2008 did not transition out of this state by 2012. 
 
Interestingly, youth are more likely to transition into the formal employee state from every 
other labour market status than their non-youth counterparts (Table 12 and  
Table 13). Since youth formal employee rates were initially very low but by 2012 were very 
similar to non-youth rates, this suggests an equalisation of formal employee rates over the 
period as comparatively more young people transitioned into being formal employees. The 
differences are particularly large in the transitions from formal self-employment, informal self-
employment, non-searching unemployment and economic inactivity. For both youth and non-
youth groups, though, there is a high degree of stickiness in the formal employee state, with 
                                               
9   See footnote 10 about race groups in South Africa 
10  Following the South African convention, we define youth here as those aged 15 to 34 years. 
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over 70 per cent of those who were formal employees in 2008 being formal employees in 
2012. Youth are also more likely than non-youth to transition into searching unemployment 
from all except the formal self-employed state, and less likely to transition into economic 
inactivity from any status in 2008. This is likely to be primarily due to older individuals 
(especially those close to age 64 in 2008) retiring from the labour force between 2008 and 
2012. While unemployment is higher amongst the youth, transitions from unemployment into 
employment—whether formal or informal—are only marginally more likely than they are for 
non-youth cohorts. 
 
Lower levels of education appear to be related to poorer ‘quality’ transitions over the period 
(Table 14 and Table 15). Amongst those with at least 12 years of education, 83.9 per cent of 
formal employees and 61.6 per cent of the formal self-employed remained in those states 
four years later; however, amongst those with fewer than 12 years of education these rates 
were 60.9 per cent and just 9.1 per cent respectively. The latter figure suggests that higher 
levels of educational attainment are a sine qua non for success in formal self-employment 
over time, a finding with important implications for policies that aim to formalise informal 
sector enterprises. Those with fewer than twelve years of education are almost always less 
likely to transition from informal employment, unemployment or inactivity to formal employee 
than those with more education; they are also more likely to transition into economic 
inactivity from every state in 2008 than those with more education. Thus, for example, 59.0 
per cent of the economically inactive in 2008 with less than twelve years of education remain 
economically inactive in 2012, compared with 35.6 per cent of those people with at least 
twelve years of education. 
 
These transition matrices suggest, firstly, that transitions from searching or non-searching 
unemployment to informal employee or self-employment are relatively rare (less than one-
fifth of the 2008 cohort in either of these statuses). Second, transitions from informality to 
formality do occur, but less than one-third of informal employees transition into being formal 
employees or self-employed over the four-year period. Third, there is virtually no evidence of 
formalisation amongst the informal self-employed over the period; in fact, the opposite effect 
appears to dominate although the sample sizes are too small to make too strong a 
conclusion. Nevertheless, informality does seem to serve as a stepping-stone to formal 
employment as these ‘upward’ transition rates are larger than the ‘downward’ transition rates 
from formality to informality. Finally, groups that are marginalised within South African society 
-women, and those with less education -appear to be constrained in their ability to make 
‘upward’ transitions.  
 
Getting the unemployed into formal employment would be the ideal outcome. However, the 
sector is clearly not able to absorb all workseekers, hence the existence of substantial 
unemployment. As an alternative, therefore, the evidence suggests that facilitating the 
transition from unemployment into informal employment will enable these individuals to 
engage in the labour market and potentially derive benefits from growth. What appears 
certain, though, is that unemployment represents isolation from the labour market and the 
broader economy, constraining growth from being truly inclusive.  
 
4.4 Household income shocks and informal sector participation 
 
4.4.1 Background 
 
As noted previously, lack of access to credit may represent a binding constraint on 
participation within the informal sector. A lack of access to credit represents a resource 
constraint on individuals wanting to participate in the labour market and may operate through 
a number of channels. Individuals may be prevented from seeking employment due to the 
costs, including transport costs, associated with searching for a job. In Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, lowering transport costs for young jobseekers has been found to raise the intensity 
30 
 
of job searches and increase the short-run probability of finding permanent employment 
(Franklin 2015). Although unable to look at costs, Hinks (2008), finds for South Africa in 2002 
that the unemployed who are more distant from public transport are less likely to actively 
seek employment, particularly in rural areas. Alternatively, this lack of resources may prevent 
individuals from starting their own businesses (Skinner 2005; Cichello 2005; Cichello et al. 
2011). 
 
Given that resource constraints may prevent individuals from finding employment or starting 
their own businesses, both of which may occur within the formal or informal sectors, it follows 
that relaxing this constraint may have a beneficial impact on employment. This section 
focuses this question on the informal sector in particular, and asks whether a positive income 
shock at the level of the household may increase the engagement of adult household 
members in the informal sector. Specifically, we examine the receipt of the state old age 
pension as a positive income shock at the household level. 
 
The South African state old age pension is a non-contributory means-tested grant. The value 
of the grant on 1 October 2015 was R1,420 (roughly US$101 at current exchange rates) and 
does not require that recipients exit the labour force. In 2012, the year that corresponds to 
our data, the grant was valued at R1,200 (or just under US$86 at current exchange rates). 
To put this value in context, it is equivalent to roughly 24.0 per cent of GDP per capita in 
2014, while in 2010 the grant value was estimated to be 75 per cent above the median 
monthly per capita income (Woolard and Leibbrandt 2010). The old age pension therefore 
represents a significant contribution to the income of many households, and may, therefore, 
be expected to have discernible impacts on a variety of household- and individual-level 
behaviours. 
 
While the impact of cash transfers on labour market behaviour - specifically allocations 
between the formal and informal sectors - has been examined in Latin America, it is relatively 
unexplored in Africa. In Mexico, for example, Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) find that there was 
a short-run impact on labour force participation of the self-employed immediately after the 
implementation of a cash transfer programme. However, this effect disappeared thereafter. 
Ribas and Soares (2011) identified a decrease in participation in the Brazilian formal sector 
amongst households that benefited from the Bolsa Familia cash transfer programme. 
Similarly, De Brauw (2013) found that the Bolsa Familia programme resulted in workers 
foregoing formal sector work for informal sector work that is less stable with fewer benefits 
and lower remunerations. Barbosa et al. (2015) however, found that cash transfers do not 
affect the occupational choices of Brazilian adults among formal and informal jobs, nor do 
they impact on the allocation of hours across sectors. Given South Africa’s extensive social 
welfare system, understanding labour market behaviour of its recipients and their household 
member serves as a useful starting point to understand entry into the informal sector.  
 
4.4.2 Data and methodology 
 
The regression discontinuity design (RDD) used in this section exploits the age-rule applied 
to pension receipt in South Africa in order to estimate the effect of pension receipt on 
household informality rates. This represents a fuzzy regression discontinuity design which 
makes use of discontinuities in the likelihood of pension receipt: before age 60, no-one 
receives the pension, while from age 60, the likelihood of receiving the pension is positive. 
This differs from a sharp regression discontinuity in that not all household members over the 
age of 60 receive the pension, i.e. the probability of pension receipt is not 1 after age 60. 
Figure 6 illustrates this by presenting individual and household access rates to the old age 
pension for 2014 by age of the individual and age of the oldest household member 
respectively. Access rates to the old age pension are zero up to age 59, rising to 44.8 per 
cent of individuals and 46.5 per cent of households at age 60. 
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In order to assess the effect of pension receipt on household informality rates, the 
discontinuity in the probability of pension receipt before and after age 60 becomes the 
instrumental variable for pension receipt. The relationship between pension receipt and age 
is evaluated in the first stage of the model. In the simplest case, the only excluded instrument 
is a dummy variable indicating the presence of someone aged 60 or above in the household, 
given in the equation below:  
 
𝐸[𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡ℎ|𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ] =  𝛽0 +  𝛾1𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ +  𝛾2𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ
2 + ⋯ +  𝛾𝑝𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ
 𝑝 +  𝜋𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦ℎ +  𝜀ℎ1 
where 𝐸[𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡ℎ|𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ] is the expected value of pension receipt given the age of 
the oldest household member and𝜋is the first-stage effect of 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦ℎ,the dummy 
variable equal to one if the oldest household member is 60 or older. 
 
The predicted value of pension receipt is then used as an explanatory variable in the second 
stage of the model, resulting in the fuzzy regression discontinuity reduced form: 
 
𝛾ℎ =  𝜇 +  𝛿1𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ +  𝛿2𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ
2 + ⋯ +  + 𝛿2𝐴𝑔𝑒ℎ
 𝑝 +  𝜌𝜋𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦ℎ +  𝜀ℎ1 
Where𝜇 =  𝛼 +  𝜌𝛽0 and𝛿𝑗 =  𝛽𝑗 +  𝜌𝛾𝑗for j=1, 2, … , p. 
 
We use both the nonparametric and parametric methods of approximating the pension effect 
on household informality rates. The non-parametric kernel method uses local linear 
regression, estimating the model in a given bandwidth around the cut-off age of 60. We used 
both the optimal and double optimal bandwidth indicated in the Imbens-Kalyanaraman 
optimal bandwidth procedure11. We also used parametric regression, including six different 
polynomial functional forms: linear, linear flexible, quadratic, quadratic flexible, cubic and 
cubic flexible, with flexible models allowing the slope on either side of the age cut-off to be 
different. We do not, however, restrict the bandwidth is these models.   
 
Overall, we utilise three different explanatory variables in our discontinuity regression 
analysis, all providing different indicators of the rate of informal sector employment within the 
household: 
 
1) Type 1 Informality: The proportion of working-aged household members who are 
employed in the informal sector. 
2) Type 2 Informality: The proportion of working-age employed household members who 
are employed in the informal sector. 
3) Type 3 Informality The proportion of working-age non-formally employed (i.e. not 
economically active, unemployed and informally employed) household members who 
are employed in the informal sector. 
 
The data we use is from the 2012 General Household Survey (GHS), a nationally 
representative household survey published by Statistics South Africa. This is one of the few 
recent official datasets that includes both a proper labour market module and data on 
household members’ receipt of grants. Since this survey focuses on living standards and 
welfare issues, it has the added advantage of variables relating to living conditions and asset 
ownership. 
 
We limit our sample to households headed by Africans or Coloureds. The key reason for this 
is that, although the pension is means-tested, the means test is applied on the basis of both 
own and spousal income as well as value of assets and, unfortunately, we are unable to 
replicate the test accurately with the available data. Limiting the sample to African- and 
Coloured-headed households, which are also the groups with the lowest mean incomes in 
                                               
11  See Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). 
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South Africa, combined with the fact that the old age pension is near universal amongst 
these groups means that our restricted sample is unlikely to include significant numbers of 
households that are ineligible for the pension. 
 
4.4.3 Tests 
 
The implementation of the RDD requires a number of tests in order for the design to be 
validated. Given space constraints, we do not report the detail of the results of all of these 
tests, but provide an overview below: 
 
Continuity of the forcing variable: In order for the RDD to be valid, the forcing variable 
(age of the oldest member of the household) must be continuous through the cut-off (60 
years, the age of pension eligibility). The null hypothesis of no discontinuity at the cut-off is 
not rejected for our sample, indicating that there is no manipulation of the forcing variable 
(discontinuity estimate 0.0538, standard error 0.04369). This can be confirmed visually in  
Figure 7. 
 
Balanced covariates: The next set of tests determines whether there are any breaks in the 
covariates at the cut-off. To do this, we calculate the mean value of each covariate within n 
intervals of the forcing variable, plot these against the forcing variable and, using a lowess 
line, inspect for discontinuities at the cut-off (Figure 8). None of the selected covariates 
displays significant discontinuities at age 60. Following Lee and Lemiuex (2010) we run a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) using various functional forms (discussed above) to 
test whether the data are consistent with no discontinuities for any of the observed 
covariates. The data, though, fails this test for all functional forms except for the flexible 
quadratic form. 
 
Discontinuity in the outcome variable: In the same way that we test for the continuity of 
the forcing variable, we test for discontinuity in the outcome variables (Figure 9). 
Unfortunately, the results do not provide strong evidence of discontinuity in the outcome 
variables. In the case of our second outcome variable - the informality rate of employed 
household members - there is a slight discontinuity. This weakness in the discontinuity 
suggests that the RDD is unlikely to yield compelling evidence of an effect of the old age 
pension on informality. 
 
4.4.4 Results 
 
The results of the non-parametric analyses for the three dependent variables are presented 
in Table 16, Table 17 and Table 18, while the corresponding parametric analyses are 
presented in Table 19, Table 20 and Table 21. Unsurprisingly, given the weakness of the 
discontinuities observed in the dependent variables, there is little evidence of an impact of 
the old age pension on informality. For the non-parametric estimates, the coefficients on the 
old age pension variable are consistently statistically insignificant and are often negative. 
This negative sign contradicts our a priori assumption of a positive coefficient: relaxing the 
resource constraint, we argued, should boost engagement in the informal sector. Similarly, 
the parametric estimates yield few statistically significant and correctly signed coefficients 
using two stage least squares: the linear specification typically yields statistically significant 
coefficients, but it is only for the second informality measure (the informality rate of employed 
household members) that a positive statistically significant coefficient is observed. 
 
Table 16 presents the results for the non-parametric analysis, with the dependent variable 
the proportion of working-age individuals in the informal sector. We focus on the results from 
the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation, which are consistent with the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation. Overall, examining the coefficient on the Living Standards 
Measure (LSM) category variable (a higher LSM category denotes higher living standards), 
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we find a statistically significant coefficient for both optimal and double optimal bandwidth on 
our informality measure. The coefficients are negative but small. This suggests that members 
of better-off households are less likely to enter the informal sector. The traditional rural area 
coefficient for the double optimal bandwidth specification is also found to be statistically 
significant, suggesting a negative effect on informality rates for those in traditional rural 
areas, which are typically relatively isolated from the mainstream economy.  
 
Table 17 presents the results for the non-parametric analysis on informality defined as the 
informality rate of employed household members (measure II). The sample is smaller at just 
615 households but the estimation yields a bigger R-squared. Similarly to the previous 
finding, the coefficient on the LSM category is statistically significant and negative for both 
the optimal and double optimal bandwidth specifications. Mean years of education is also 
significant and negative correlated with informality in both specifications, suggesting that the 
better educated are less likely to be employed in the informal sector. For both variables 
related to the number of children in a household, we find statistically significant negative 
coefficients. This suggests that households with more children under 15 years are less likely 
to be employed informally. The coefficient on the per capita number of mobiles in a 
household is statistically significant and positive for both specifications. However, the 
coefficient on the variable related to internet in a household is statistically significant and 
negative for both specifications. This result is to be expected as internet access at a 
household level is to some extent an indicator of wealth: households that are wealthier and 
have access to internet have lower rates of informality.  
 
In terms of the estimation based on the third measure of informality - the informality rate 
amongst adult household members who are not employed in the formal sector - we find three 
negative weakly significant coefficients: the LSM category, household access to other grants, 
and residence in a traditional rural area.  
 
In terms of the parametric analysis for the first informality measure (Table 19), similarly to the 
previous results, the coefficient on the LSM category, running water in the household, access 
to internet and location in traditional rural area variables, are strongly significant and negative 
for all six specifications. For access to other grants, we also find a strongly significant 
negative coefficient for all specifications. This suggests that households that receive other 
grants have lower informality rates. The coefficient on the mean years of education variable 
is positive which is contrary to previous results, although the coefficients are small.  
 
Using the second measure of informality as the dependent variable (Table 20), we find 
negative statistically significant coefficients on the a number of variables including the age of 
the oldest household member (Oldest Age), LSM category, access to other grants, mean 
years of education, running water in the household, household access to the internet, 
location in a traditional rural or commercial agriculture area. It is not surprising that wealthier 
(indicative from internet access and running water) and better educated households have 
lower informality rates. This estimation also yields a strongly positive coefficient on the 
variable related to the mean number of mobiles in a household.     
 
Overall, then, there is some degree of consistency in the results beyond the insignificance of 
the old age pension variable. Informality measured according to any of our three definitions is 
typically negatively associated with proxies for wealth or living standards. Thus, the 
coefficients on the LSM category, access to running water and access to the internet are 
typically negative and often statistically significant. Similarly, the presence of more children 
within the household is often negatively correlated with our measures of informality, as is 
location in a rural area (whether traditional rural area or commercial agricultural area). 
 
Given the fact that the underlying assumptions for a valid RDD are not fully met, these 
results must be treated as tentative. Nevertheless, we believe this to be an interesting area 
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for further, more in-depth research. One of the key constraints in conducting this analysis has 
been our inability to control for some of the dynamic effects of pension receipt, particularly 
insofar as it may impact on household formation. Thus, for example, we know that the old 
age pension may attract new household members, particularly unemployed youth (Klasen 
and Woolard 2009), and that the pension may finance out-migration for the purposes of job 
search (Posel et al. 2006). It may, therefore, be worthwhile trying to explore this issue further 
using a panel dataset in which we are able to exploit the panel to control for some of these 
compositional effects. The NIDS data is one option, but it can unfortunately only distinguish 
formal and informal employment, rather than formal sector and informal sector employment. 
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
The case study on the characteristics and transitions within South Africa’s labour market 
presents a few distinct trends, often in direct contrast to the findings presented in relation to 
the broader sub-Saharan Africa region. Although we do not have data on labour market 
transitions in the sub-Saharan Africa region, there are noticeable differences that play a key 
role in the relationship between informality and its impact on inclusive growth. 
 
Firstly, the transition from unemployment to the informal sector seems far more prevalent in 
the sub-Saharan Africa region than in South Africa. Low-income countries in Africa are 
synonymous with underemployment rather than unemployment (Golub and Hayat, 2010), 
suggesting that there is a natural progression for individuals to move from an unemployed 
state into informal employment. In addition, the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa plays a 
significant commercial role and is linked to the formal sector rather than competing against it, 
while weak enforcement of the tax regime means that there are few differences between the 
formal and the informal sector (Gelb 2009). South Africa’s relatively small informal sector 
does not command significant labour market transitions. In part, this is because of the 
localised nature of informal activity given the spatial segregation that characterises South 
African cities.  
 
Secondly, South Africa stands out as having a larger labour market component of informal 
employment in the formal sector, rather than informal sector employment. This is inconsistent 
with the aggregate figures outlined earlier on regarding informality in the sub-Saharan Africa 
region where more than half of the informally employed are found in the informal sector and 
a far lower proportion of individuals are informally employed outside of the informal sector. 
We find that the transition into informal employment is a symptom of non-compliance in what 
is typically viewed as the formal sector. Non-compliance is a common feature across the 
region; however, the consequences of regulations and rights not being upheld are different in 
South Africa relative to the region. In sub-Saharan Africa, non-compliance has led to a large 
informal sector whilst in South Africa, non-compliance has led to a large number of 
individuals employed in the formal sector without certain non-wage benefits. Whilst the latter 
is probably true for the region, it is certainly not the most pervasive form of informal 
employment. As such, unemployed South Africans are far more likely to transition into formal 
employment, informal employment or economic inactivity, compared with transitioning into 
informal self-employment. This suggests that unemployed South Africans are more likely to 
accept ‘vulnerable’ employment in the mainstream economy, instead of starting a micro-
enterprise. One may argue that starting a micro-enterprise in the current South African 
economic climate is a form of equally vulnerable employment.  
 
Thirdly, whilst we find that almost one-third (32.7 per cent) of individuals transitioned from the 
informal employee to formal employee labour market states, we find virtually none 
transitioning from informal to formal self-employment. The transition from informal to formal 
employee may be an outcome of better compliance by firms due to greater resources 
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dedicated to enforcement by the state or a stricter penalty structure. The lack of transitions 
from informal to formal self-employment seems to suggest that informal enterprises in South 
Africa are survivalist in nature, suffering from both internal and external constraints (Grimm et 
al. 2012). In terms of internal constraints, those that are informally employed are more likely 
to have no education or just primary education. In terms of external constraints, South 
Africa’s informal sector was severely impacted by the recession and a number of jobs were 
lost. Access to credit and, more recently, a reliable source of energy have also presented 
challenges to expansion within the informal sector. However, relative to sub-Saharan Africa, 
Southern Africa is found to have better enforcement of laws, access to credit and energy 
supply, which means that firms face fewer external constraints and are more likely to start off 
as formal enterprises (Gelb 2009). Importantly, though, the transition matrices indicate 
extremely poor outcomes for the formal self-employed who do not have at least twelve years 
of education. Additional constraints in enhancing the size of an enterprise, whether formal or 
informal, include the concentrated nature of the formal sector that restricts competition.  
 
The main research question behind this study asks whether the informal sector constrains or 
promotes inclusive growth. In South Africa, whilst the informal sector provides an alternative 
to unemployment for low-skilled individuals, it is too small and localised to successfully 
absorb the bulk of the unemployed. We do, however, find that the transition from informal to 
formal employment promotes inclusive growth. Despite this, the evidence related to 
employment and GDP growth rates confirms that informal sector employment growth rates 
recovered more rapidly than formal sector employment growth, absorbing the unemployed 
into employment more rapidly than would have been the case otherwise. This flexibility 
evidenced in the post-recession expansion of informal sector employment also implies a 
greater variability in employment levels as employment contracted sharply at the time of the 
recession. As a result, households that are unable to diversify their income sources away 
from sole reliance on the informal sector remain extremely vulnerable to labour market 
shocks of this nature. This is particularly true in the absence of automatic stabilisers such as 
a broad-based unemployment insurance system. 
 
Given South Africa’s unemployment rate, the transition between unemployment and either 
formal or informal employment are positive for inclusive growth. This is particularly true since 
we see a significant number of individuals transition from unemployment into economic 
inactivity, which isolates them from any positive outcomes of inclusive growth. Informal 
employment, whilst less secure, and informal sector employment, whist of a fairly small 
scale, both contribute positively to household income. In turn, this improves household 
welfare as measured by money-metric poverty. Further, based on our decomposition of the 
Gini coefficient by labour market status, the transition from unemployment to informality has 
a beneficial (although small) impact on inequality. With formal employees accounting for an 
overwhelming proportion of total inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, it is clear that 
informality, in the absence of significant increases in mean earnings in that sector, is unlikely 
to play a significant role in reducing inequality. However, this latter finding is tied to South 
Africa’s specific context as a country with massive unemployment; as such, it is unlikely to 
hold true in countries where unemployment is rare and informality dominates. Importantly, 
though, the extent to which the informal sector promotes inclusive growth will depend on the 
extent to which a micro-enterprise can overcome both external and internal constraints. We 
discuss options for policymakers in terms of doing away with these constraints in the section 
that follows.  
 
Finally, we do not find any compelling evidence that the old age pension contributes to 
facilitating entry of working-age household members into informal sector employment. This is 
not to say that positive income shocks do not positively contribute to informal sector activity 
in South Africa, since it is quite possible that the effect is not detectable due to the impact of 
grant income on household composition. This is an area for future research: accounting for  
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the dynamic impact of additional income on household structure is important in the context of 
evidence that grants may facilitate labour market interactions by financing migration to urban 
areas (Posel et al. 2006). 
 
 
6 Conclusion and policy recommendations 
 
The relationship between informality and the inclusiveness of economic growth is complex 
and varies in different contexts. The issue is further complicated when one considers that 
there are really two alternatives to informality—formality and unemployment—rather than 
simply formality. It is this switch in thinking that frames the question of informality and the 
informal sector in a somewhat more balanced light. As expected at the outset, though, there 
is no simple answer to the question of whether informality promotes or constrains inclusive 
growth. 
 
Based on the regional evidence synthesis and the case study on South Africa we have 
provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between informality and inclusive growth and 
point to a few key findings that lead to the policy recommendations discussed below. Firstly, 
we find that the informal sector promotes inclusive growth through providing an alternative to 
unemployment when there are no alternative employment opportunities available, particularly 
for those with low skills as well as women and young people. This is true for sub-Saharan 
Africa broadly, as well as for South Africa. In terms of our measures of inclusive growth, the 
unemployment-informality transition reduces poverty, but is unlikely to have much effect on 
inequality in a high-unemployment society such as South Africa. Given the important role that 
the informal sector plays in providing employment opportunities for the vulnerable, 
policymakers need to approach this sector carefully in order to promote inclusivity. In 
particular, it is imperative to understand why individuals remain in the informal sector. Often, 
in the sub-Saharan Africa region as well as in South Africa, informality is the only available 
opportunity for engaging in the economy. A lack of employment opportunities for low-skilled 
workers, particularly for those that have migrated from rural areas, results in large urban 
informal sectors. A number of countries in Africa have failed to diversify their manufacturing 
base and remain dependent on sectors that do not necessarily create significant 
employment. Given the inability of the formal economy to absorb labour, the informal sector 
should be viewed in a positive light by policymakers as it provides opportunities for 
employment and entrepreneurship, which are preferable to unemployment.  
 
However, in South Africa we find that transitions from searching or non-searching 
unemployment to informal sector employment are relatively rare. In addition, we find that 
women and those with less education are far less likely to transition upwards and therefore 
the informal sector plays a key role as an employer of vulnerable groups in society. One 
particular finding was that those who have less than twelve years of education and are 
formally self-employed are more likely to transition downwards than upwards. Furthermore, 
very few remain in formal self-employment by the end of the period when compared with 
their counterparts with at least twelve years of education, most likely due to internal 
constraints. Thus there are two specific challenges that policymakers should address: the 
overarching skills gap, specifically in entrepreneurship and practical business management; 
and the failure of female-run micro-enterprises to progress. Skills constraints are often an 
outcome of poor quality schooling, which is prevalent for the majority of households at the 
lower end of the income distribution. Therefore, there is a larger issue at stake for 
policymakers to deal with regarding the infrastructure and quality of teaching in schools. 
Schooling should also be used as a tool to empower young women who may want to 
become entrepreneurs instead of transitioning from school to a traditional formal sector type 
job. In addition, specifically targeted incentives and business incubators should be used to 
support female-run micro-enterprises.  
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Secondly, we find that formal sector workers are better off than informal sector workers. The 
informal sector may therefore inhibit inclusive growth when workers find themselves in 
precarious positions where earning benefits are outweighed by job insecurity and other 
potential negative impacts associated with informal employment. In South Africa, we find that 
only one-third of informal employees transitioned into formal employment over the four-year 
period examined. In addition, there is virtually no evidence of formalisation amongst the 
informal self-employed over the period. Nevertheless, informality does seem to serve as a 
stepping-stone to formal employment as these ‘upward’ transition rates are larger than the 
‘downward’ transition rates from formality to informality. Lastly, we do not find any compelling 
evidence that the old age pension contributes to facilitating entry of other household 
members into informal sector employment.  
 
For those informal sector enterprises that are larger and more profitable, policymakers 
should aim to promote their growth so that they join the formal sector more organically. The 
evidence suggests that policies that are supportive of informal sector firms and that 
encourage their growth are more likely to lead to transitions to formality. This typically 
requires providing access to basic services such as electricity and water, as well as suitable 
space for their activities. In addition, information and communication technology (ICT) should 
be made accessible for broader communities including those in rural areas, although this 
requires prices to be more competitive. As has been found in West Africa, if informal 
businesses are given a space in which they can operate and grow, some transition into the 
formal sector and begin to compete in higher value products. This is preferable to enforcing 
legislation that penalises micro-enterprises, with those unable to afford the costs of 
compliance being forced out of the market. While such policies may reduce informality in the 
short run, they certainly have a negative impact on welfare and isolate individuals from the 
potential benefits of economic growth. In addition, firms that are better off are more likely to 
contribute to the economy, either through moving into the formal sector and contributing to 
the tax base or by providing a service at a fair price that promotes the welfare of consumers. 
 
In many countries, informal sector firms choose to be informal to avoid taxes and other costs 
related to formality. Whilst evidence suggests that incorporating these businesses into the 
tax base would not necessarily contribute a significant amount of revenue (relative to GDP), 
the larger challenge is institutional in that, at present, few governments have the capacity to 
enforce compliance with tax legislation. This underlines the numerous broader institutional 
challenges that policymakers have to address.   
 
Finally, the flexibility that characterises the informal sector may have a positive role in 
promoting inclusive growth in the aftermath of economic contractions. The evidence from 
South Africa indicates that, although informal sector employment contracted during the 
recession in 2009, it rebounded to growth far sooner than either formal sector employment or 
employment in private households. This meant that the unemployed were absorbed into 
employment more rapidly than would have been the case in the absence of the informal 
sector. However, it also means that households that are reliant on the informal sector for 
income are vulnerable to employment shocks, particularly given the weak coverage of these 
workers by unemployment programmes. 
 
In general, South African policies aimed at formalisation of informal activities have not been 
particularly successful and are often counter-productive to inclusive growth outcomes. It is 
imperative that such policies are designed in a way that supports the vulnerable, including 
aspects such as skills development, provision of appropriate operating spaces, a 
straightforward and simple process of business registration, and incentive schemes. This is 
preferred to a heavy-handed approach that penalises firms operating informally because they 
cannot afford to formalise, given the numerous internal constraints faced. Given the clear 
benefits of formality over informality for workers, high-unemployment countries should not 
simply try to steer their economies towards greater informality without implementing 
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programmes that improve the likelihood of firms transitioning from informality to formality. 
Such programmes would need to address at least two binding constraints on formalisation: 
first, they should aim to reduce barriers to formalisation, making it easier for firms to 
transition into the formal sector; and second, they should overcome the reluctance of 
informal firms to formalise by clearly and consistently demonstrating that the formalisation 
process provides substantial benefits for both the firms and their workers. 
 
In summary, then, informality has both positive and negative implications for inclusive 
growth, depending on a variety of factors. Perhaps one of the key considerations for 
policymakers in this area is the extent and importance of heterogeneity of firms and 
individuals active within the informal sector. Without due consideration of this fact, policies 
aimed at promoting formality may reinforce existing inequalities within the economy by 
excluding those who would stand to benefit most from a more inclusive growth path. 
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Appendix A: Figures and tables 
 
Table 1: Defining informality in sub-Saharan Africa 
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 IS IS IS+IE IS IS+IE IS+IE IS+IE IS IS+IE IS+IE IS+IE 
Informal sector 
Legal status x x      x    
Registration x  x x x x x  x x x 
Accounts x x      x    
Size x  x    x     
Perception   x         
Household  x      x x   
Informal employment 
Social 
security 
  x  x    x x  
Paid leave     x x   x x x 
Sick leave     x    x  x 
Pension   x  x x x    x 
Medical aid   x  x x x     
Contract       x    x 
Maternity 
leave 
          x 
Tax      x       
Source: Botswana CSO (2009); Uganda Bureau Of Statistics (2013); Lesotho Bureau of Statistics (2013); 
Namibia Statistics Agency (2015); Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics (2010); Malawi National Statistics Office 
(2014); Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (2007); Zim Stat (2015); Central Statistical Office (2013); Statistics 
South Africa(2008). 
Notes: 1. ‘Legal status’ refers to whether an enterprise is incorporated (i.e. separate to owner). Unincorporated 
enterprises are deemed informal. 2. ‘Registration’ refers to whether an enterprise is registered with government 
institution. 3. ‘Accounts’ refer to whether an enterprise keeps a complete set of accounts separate to that of the 
owners. An enterprise is deemed informal if it does not keep a set of accounts. 4. ‘Size’ refers to the number of 
employees/workers in the enterprise. Exceeding a minimum threshold classifies an enterprise as formal. 5. 
‘Perception’ refers to whether an enterprise owner perceives his/her business to be formal or informal. 6. 
‘Household’ refers to household enterprises being deemed informal. 7. ‘Social security’ refers to whether an 
employee receives social security benefits. 8. ‘Paid leave’ refers to whether an employee receives paid leave. 9. 
‘Sick leave’ refers to whether an employee receives paid sick leave. 10. ‘Pension’ refers to whether an employee 
receives pension contributions from his/her employer. 11. ‘Medical aid’ refers to whether an employee receives 
medical aid contributions from his/her employer. 12. ‘Contract’ refers to whether an employee is employed under 
a written employment contract. 13. ‘Maternity’ refers to whether an employee receives paid maternity leave. 14. 
`Tax’ refers to whether an employee has income tax deducted from his/her income. 14. IS = only informal sector 
measure; IS+IE = informal sector and informal employment measure. 
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Figure 1: Informal sector employment as share of non-agricultural employment in 
developing countries 
Source: Own calculations, ILO (2015). 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment and informal employment 
 
Source: Own calculations, ILOSTAT (2015) 
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Table 2: Ratio of wages to public sector wages in selected southern and eastern 
African countries 
  Namibia South Africa Tanzania Zambia 
 Mean 
Media
n Mean 
Media
n Mean 
Media
n Mean 
Media
n 
Informal         
Agricultural 0.1829 0.3478 0.1944 0.1905 0.2219 0.1000 0.2529 0.1973 
Non-Agricultural 0.2787 0.4348 0.6125 0.3438 0.1962 0.2198 0.3250 0.2133 
Formal             
Private 1.6975 2.6087 0.9199 0.6032 0.3931 0.4167 0.7057 0.4265 
Private 
Households 0.1648 0.3043 0.1771 0.2222       
Source: Labour Force Survey (2012) for Namibia; Labour Market Dynamics Survey (2014) for South Africa; 
Labour force Survey (2012) for Zambia and Integrated Labour Force Survey (2006) for Tanzania.  
Notes: All estimates are for the employed population between 15 and 65 years.  
 
Table 3: Formal and informal sector workers’ wages and access to benefits, South 
Africa, 2015 
 
Formal 
 
Informal 
 
Private 
House-
holds  
Statistically Significant 
Differences 
Formal 
vs. 
Informal 
Informal 
vs. 
Private 
HHs 
Formal 
vs. 
Private 
HHs 
Per cent Per cent Per cent 
Contracts        
Limited duration 15.1 7.8 5.2  * * * 
Permanent 66.5 10.1 25.8  * * * 
Unspecified duration 12.4 24.6 68.4  * * * 
Written contract 87.0 17.0 20.4  * * * 
Employer 
Contributions        
Medical aid 35.6 0.3 0.6  *  * 
Unemployment 
insurance 65.0 10.2 22.1  * * * 
Pension 54.7 2.3 4.5  * * * 
Leave Entitlements        
Paid annual leave 69.5 8.5 21.5  * * * 
Paid sick leave 73.4 11.0 25.4  * * * 
Paid maternity leave 64.4 7.3 12.1  * * * 
Hours of Work        
0-19 hours 2.1 7.7 15.5  * * * 
20-39 hours 7.7 16.9 29.4  * * * 
40-44 hours 45.3 16.7 30.6  * * * 
45-49 hours 26.9 16.5 12.8  * * * 
50+ hours 18.0 42.1 11.7  * * * 
Union Membership        
Unionisation rate 32.6 1.2 0.4  * * * 
Incomes (Rands)        
Mean monthly wage  10 502   6 645   1 983   † * * 
Mean hourly wage  252.42 157.43 84.20  * * * 
Median monthly wage 3 800 2 000 1 300  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Median hourly wage 86.67 47.92 42.86  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Own calculations, QLFS 2015Q2. 
Notes: An asterisk (*) signifies statistically significant differences at the 95 per cent level of confidence. A 
dagger (†) signifies statistically significant differences at the 90 per cent level of confidence. The current 
exchange rate is approximately US$1 = R14. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between informality and GDP per capita 
 
Source: Own calculations, ILOSTAT (2015) 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between informality and poverty 
 
Source: Own calculations, ILOSTAT (2015) 
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Table 4: Formal and informal employment by individual characteristics, South Africa, 
2012 
  Employed 
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TOTAL 27.3 1.3 11.5 3.6 14.8 2.5 39.1 34.6 
Race          
African 24.4 0.4 12.1 3.9 16.5 2.3 40.4 39.4 
Coloured 32.5 1.0 14.1 1.1 10.2 4.6 36.6 31.2 
Asian/Indian 33.4 1.8 7.7 4.1 9.2 3.5 40.3 25.1 
White 47.9 10.0 4.0 2.4 4.8 2.3 28.6 9.9 
Gender           
Male 34.4 1.9 12.2 4.0 13.8 1.8 32.0 31.0 
Female 21.4 0.8 10.9 3.2 15.7 3.1 45.0 38.9 
Education Level           
None 8.1 0.0 18.2 4.1 8.0 2.9 58.9 73.8 
Primary 16.3 0.3 14.7 4.8 13.0 2.7 48.2 54.2 
Incompletesecondary 18.2 0.5 11.9 3.3 15.8 3.3 47.2 45.0 
Complete secondary 37.6 0.8 11.3 3.6 17.2 2.2 27.4 27.9 
Post-secondary 59.0 2.2 6.1 3.5 15.6 0.5 13.2 13.6 
Tertiary 65.8 17.4 2.2 0.5 5.8 0.1 8.2 3.2 
Age           
15-24 years 6.6 0.3 6.2 1.0 14.9 3.1 67.8 51.1 
25-34 years 36.2 0.9 14.1 3.8 21.8 1.6 21.7 32.6 
35-44 years 41.4 1.5 15.9 4.9 15.2 3.3 18.0 32.7 
45-54 years 37.6 1.1 13.3 6.2 9.2 2.8 30.1 33.6 
55-64 years 18.8 5.4 7.8 3.7 3.6 1.3 59.7 32.5 
Location           
Urban areas 34.8 1.9 11.2 3.4 14.3 2.5 31.9 28.6 
Traditional rural areas 12.7 0.4 10.8 3.9 16.7 2.9 52.8 53.3 
Commercial farming 
areas 
26.2 0.6 17.9 3.2 10.3 1.5 40.5 44.2 
Sector           
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
50.7 1.9 42.6 4.9 - - - 47.5 
Mining and quarrying 97.9 0.1 1.9 0.1 - - - 2.0 
Manufacturing 77.1 0.4 12.5 10.0 - - - 22.5 
Utilities 59.0 1.1 29.0 10.9 - - - 39.9 
Construction 30.5 3.0 54.3 12.2 - - - 66.5 
Wholesale and retail trade 69.0 4.5 16.9 9.7 - - - 26.6 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
60.0 13.8 20.5 5.7 - - - 26.2 
Financial and business 
services 
87.5 2.3 8.2 2.0 - - - 10.2 
Community, social and 
personal services 
77.4 2.2 15.1 5.3 - - - 20.4 
Private households 13.7 0.8 67.2 18.3 - - - 85.5 
Wages (Rands)         
Mean Monthly Wage 6 260 20 237 1 845 1 684 - - - - 
Median Monthly Wage 4 100 10 000 1 300 1 000 - - - - 
Source: NIDS (2012). 
Note: All statistics are weighted using calibrated Wave 3 weights. The current exchange rate is approximately 
US$1 = R14. 
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Table 5: Poverty headcount and poverty gap by employment status, 2012 
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Lower bound poverty line (R584per capita per month) 
Headcount  
17.5 4.9 44.5 37.7 56.5 59.1 58.7 
(0.963) (3.181) (1.890) (2.756) (1.682) (4.282) (1.040) 
Poverty gap 
6.5 1.0 19.4 16.0 26.2 29.1 28.4 
(0.367) (0.561) (0.935) (1.259) (0.887) (2.304) (0.574) 
Upper bound poverty line (R1 141per capita per month) 
Headcount  
34.1 10.5 70.8 64.1 78.7 79.8 76.1 
(1.354) (4.114) (1.932) (3.183) (1.574) (3.948) (1.066) 
Poverty gap 
16.4 4.0 39.4 34.2 47.4 50.0 48.2 
(0.686) (1.957) (1.247) (1.874) (1.079) (2.825) (0.743) 
Source: NIDS (2012), Budlender et al (2015). 
Note: All statistics are weighted using calibrated Wave 3 weights. The current exchange rate is approximately 
US$1 = R14. Poverty lines expressed in December 2012 prices. Poverty measures are calculated using per 
capita household expenditure. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Table 6: Decomposition of individual labour earnings, South Africa, 2012 
 
Proportion 
of 
individuals 
Share in 
total 
income 
Gini for 
income for 
individuals
receiving 
such 
income 
Gini 
coefficient 
for income 
source 
Gini 
correlation 
with total 
income 
rankings 
Contribu-
tion to Gini 
coefficient 
of total 
income 
Share in 
overall 
Gini 
 Pk Sk Ga Gk Rk SkGkRk Per cent 
Formal employee 0.453 0.782 0.492 0.770 0.943 0.568 81.5 
Formal self-
employed 0.022 0.103 0.578 0.992 0.937 0.095 13.7 
Informal employee 0.179 0.085 0.476 0.906 0.294 0.023 3.2 
Informal self-
employed 0.062 0.031 0.564 0.973 0.374 0.011 1.6 
Unemployed 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.715 -1.000 0.000 0.0 
TOTAL 1.000 1.000    0.697 100.0 
Source: NIDS (2012). 
Note: All statistics are weighted using calibrated Wave 3 weights. Zero incomes -for the employed and the 
unemployed -are adjusted by adding R 0.000001, so that these incomes are included in the estimations. The 
unemployed include both searching and non-searching unemployed. 
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Figure 5: Economic growth and formal and informal employment in South Africa, 
2008Q1-2015Q2 
 
Source: Own calculations, Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, 2008Q1-2015Q2 (Statistics South Africa); South 
African Reserve Bank (2015). 
Notes: GDP growth rates calculated as quarterly year-on-year growth rates of seasonally adjusted real GDP at 
constant 2010 prices. Employment growth rates are quarterly year-on-year growth rates. QLFS data only begins 
in 2008Q1; therefore, year-on-year changes are only available from 2009Q1 onwards. 
 
Table 7: Correlation between quarterly employment change and GDP change, 2008-
2015 
 Formal 
sector 
employment 
Informal 
sector 
employment 
Private 
household 
employment 
Real GDP 
Real GDP 
(lagged) 
Formal sector 
employment 
1.0000     
Informal sector 
employment 
0.2792 1.0000    
Private household 
employment 
0.6413 0.0176 1.0000   
Real GDP  0.2800 0.6297 -0.0059 1.0000  
Real GDP (lagged) 0.6231 -0.3801 0.3951 -0.4028 1.0000 
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, 2008Q1-2015Q2 (Statistics South Africa); South African Reserve Bank 
(2015). 
Notes: Correlation coefficients calculated using quarterly year-on-year employment and GDP growth rates. 
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Table 8: South African labour market transition matrix, 2008 to 2012 
     Status in 2012 
 
  
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 29.9 1.2 12.0 5.1 15.8 2.6 33.4 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
23.0 74.0 1.2 7.0 1.3 5.5 0.8 10.2 
Formal Self-
employed 
1.4 16.9 41.5 1.6 18.0 9.9 0.9 11.0 
Informal 
Employee 
13.3 32.7 0.5 23.3 3.0 12.0 2.5 26.1 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
7.7 10.6 1.8 9.3 20.1 13.2 1.6 43.4 
Searching 
unemployed 
15.7 21.1 0.6 14.8 5.2 26.6 2.7 29.1 
Non-search 
unemployed 
5.6 12.7 0.1 13.3 4.9 26.4 7.9 34.6 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
33.3 8.7 0.3 9.5 4.2 19.1 2.9 55.2 
Source: Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 
per cent. 
 
Table 9: South African labour market transition matrix for Africans, 2008 to 2012 
     Status in 2012 
 
  
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
22.2 0.4 10.4 4.8 14.8 2.2 45.2 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
18.7 73.3 0.4 7.5 1.6 5.7 0.8 10.6 
Formal Self-
employed 
0.9 22.8 21.8 1.4 23.1 18.1 1.7 11.1 
Informal 
Employee 
12.1 32.4 0.3 25.6 3.3 12.3 2.2 23.9 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
8.8 9.0 1.5 8.6 19.4 12.7 1.6 47.3 
Searching 
unemployed 
16.2 20.5 0.2 15.0 5.3 27.5 2.1 29.5 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
5.3 11.9 0.2 13.0 5.8 29.6 6.9 32.5 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
38.0 7.0 0.2 8.5 4.6 18.2 2.5 59.0 
Source:  Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 
per cent. 
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Table 10: South African labour market transition matrix for males, 2008 to 2012 
Males 
  Status in 2012 
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
38.5 1.5 13.0 5.7 14.8 1.7 24.8 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
31.9 75.3 1.6 7.6 1.6 4.4 0.9 8.6 
Formal Self-
employed 
2.1 16.3 41.1 1.7 15.3 11.7 0.0 13.9 
Informal 
Employee 
15.8 36.7 0.3 22.2 4.1 9.9 2.4 24.2 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
6.9 15.2 1.2 12.4 22.0 18.0 0.4 30.9 
Searching 
unemployed 
12.4 30.5 0.3 14.7 6.4 27.4 1.2 19.5 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
3.3 14.4 0.0 15.2 5.3 39.9 1.5 23.8 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
27.6 11.7 0.5 11.9 4.5 22.9 1.8 46.7 
Source: Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 
per cent. 
 
Table 11: South African labour market transition matrix for females, 2008 to 2012 
Females 
  Status in 2012 
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
23.3 0.9 11.3 4.6 16.5 3.3 40.0 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
16.7 72.2 0.6 6.2 1.0 7.0 0.6 12.3 
Formal Self-
employed 
0.9 18.0 42.1 1.5 22.5 7.2 2.5 6.3 
Informal 
Employee 
11.5 28.8 0.6 24.4 1.8 14.0 2.6 27.9 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
8.2 7.9 2.1 7.4 18.9 10.4 2.3 51.0 
Searching 
unemployed 
18.1 16.5 0.7 14.8 4.6 26.2 3.4 33.7 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
7.3 12.2 0.2 12.7 4.8 22.0 10.0 38.0 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
37.3 7.1 0.1 8.3 4.1 17.1 3.5 59.8 
Source: Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 
per cent. 
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Table 12: South African labour market transition matrix for 15-34 year olds, 2008 to 2012 
15-34 year olds 
  Status in 2012 
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
29.3 1.0 13.0 3.9 22.3 2.4 28.0 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
17.5 71.8 2.0 8.7 1.2 7.0 0.4 8.8 
Formal Self-
employed 
0.7 33.8 42.2 4.1 16.7 0.0 0.0 3.1 
Informal 
Employee 
11.7 39.4 0.4 20.0 3.4 16.2 2.2 18.4 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
5.2 19.6 1.5 16.8 11.4 23.3 1.5 25.9 
Searching 
unemployed 
20.0 23.0 0.8 14.2 4.7 30.6 2.4 24.2 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
5.9 19.2 0.3 15.2 4.2 29.9 4.0 27.2 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
39.0 11.7 0.3 10.9 2.9 27.1 3.0 44.1 
Source:  Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 
per cent. 
 
Table 13: South African labour market transition matrix for 35-64 year olds, 2008 to 2012 
35-64 year olds 
  Status in 2012 
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
30.6 1.4 10.8 6.5 8.2 2.8 39.7 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
29.4 75.5 0.6 5.9 1.4 4.5 1.1 11.1 
Formal Self-
employed 
2.2 10.9 41.3 0.7 18.5 13.5 1.3 13.8 
Informal 
Employee 
15.1 26.8 0.5 26.2 2.6 8.3 2.7 32.8 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
10.5 5.7 1.9 5.1 24.9 7.6 1.6 53.2 
Searching 
unemployed 
10.8 17.0 0.1 16.0 6.2 18.1 3.3 39.3 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
5.3 4.6 0.0 11.1 5.9 21.9 12.8 43.8 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
26.7 3.7 0.2 7.4 6.4 5.8 2.8 73.7 
Source: Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 
per cent. 
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Table 14: South African labour market transition matrix for those with less than 12 
years of education, 2008 to 2012 
Less than 12 years of 
education 
  Status in 2012 
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
20.4 0.5 13.6 5.5 16.8 3.1 40.2 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
14.5 60.9 0.9 12.5 2.2 8.3 1.8 13.5 
Formal Self-
employed 
0.8 25.1 9.1 0.1 16.2 26.0 2.5 21.0 
Informal 
Employee 
14.8 29.4 0.2 24.9 3.3 11.0 2.9 28.4 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
8.8 8.2 1.4 9.2 20.0 11.7 1.3 48.2 
Searching 
unemployed 
14.9 15.5 0.7 16.1 5.7 26.5 3.4 32.1 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
6.5 9.8 0.2 14.2 4.8 26.5 7.9 36.6 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
39.8 6.3 0.1 9.2 4.3 17.9 3.1 59.0 
Source: Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 per cent. 
 
Table 15: South African labour market transition matrix for those with at least 12 years 
of education, 2008 to 2012 
At least 12 years of 
education 
  Status in 2012 
Formal 
Employee 
Formal 
Self-
employed 
Informal 
Employee 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Non-
Searching 
Unem-
ployed 
Not 
Economi-
cally 
Active 
   Year 
Total 
51.2 2.7 8.8 4.1 13.2 1.7 18.3 
S
ta
tu
s
 i
n
 2
0
0
8
 
Formal 
Employee 
43.2 83.9 1.4 3.0 0.6 3.3 0.0 7.7 
Formal Self-
employed 
2.9 11.8 61.6 2.6 19.2 0.0 0.0 4.9 
Informal 
Employee 
9.8 43.7 1.4 17.5 1.8 15.1 1.1 19.5 
Informal 
Self-
employed 
4.9 20.7 3.5 9.5 20.5 19.6 2.7 23.5 
Searching 
unemployed 
17.5 32.0 0.4 12.2 4.2 26.7 1.2 23.3 
Non-search. 
unemployed 
3.8 24.2 0.0 11.9 5.2 25.3 7.7 25.7 
Not 
Economi-
cally Active 
17.9 21.0 1.1 11.4 3.8 25.0 2.0 35.6 
Source: Own calculations, NIDS Wave 1 and Wave 3. 
Notes:  All statistics weighted using Wave 1 to Wave 3 panel weights. Rows in the interior matrix sum to 100.0 per cent. 
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Figure 6: Access to the old age pension in South Africa, 2014 
 
Source:  Own calculations, GHS (2014). 
Notes:  Household access rates calculated according to the age of the oldest household member. 
 
Figure 7: Continuity of the forcing variable (age of oldest member of the household) 
 
Source:  Own calculations, GHS (2014). 
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Figure 8: Checking for balanced covariates 
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Source:  Own calculations, GHS (2014). 
 
Figure 9: Checking for discontinuities in the outcome variable 
 
 
 
Source:  Own calculations, GHS (2014). 
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Table 16: Non-parametric OLS and fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of pension 
receipt on Informality Measure I 
 OLS  2SLS 
Informality Measure I 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Double 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Double 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Old-Age Pension in HH -0.020 -0.008  -0.049 0.040 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.04) 
Oldest Age 0.028** 0.001  0.037* -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.01) 
LSM Category -0.020** -0.013**  -0.021** -0.012** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Other Grant in HH -0.031 -0.026**  -0.031 -0.026** 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Mean Years Education -0.001 0.001  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 0-6 in HH -0.006 -0.007  -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
# Children Aged 7-14 in HH -0.009 -0.005  -0.008 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Running Water in HH 0.020 -0.004  0.020 -0.005 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Electricity in HH 0.053 0.031  0.054 0.029 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) 
Mean # mobiles in HH 0.009 0.013  0.008 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Internet in HH -0.022 -0.011  -0.022 -0.010 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Vehicle in HH 0.009 -0.007  0.006 -0.004 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Traditional rural area -0.033 -0.032**  -0.033 -0.033** 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Commercial agricultural 
area 
0.036 0.025  0.039 0.021 
 (0.05) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.03) 
Constant -1.527** 0.076  -2.057* 0.492 
 (0.66) (0.19)  (1.19) (0.35) 
R-Squared 0.051 0.028  0.048 0.021 
N 813 1 803  813 1 803 
Source: GHS (2014). Own Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Weighted using household weights. 2. ‘Mean years education’ is the mean years of education for adult 
household members. 3. The base area dummy is urban. 3. Province dummies are included in each regression but 
not reported. 
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Table 17: Non-parametric OLS and fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of pension 
receipt on Informality Measure II 
 OLS  2SLS 
Informality Measure II 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Double 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Double 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Old-Age Pension in HH -0.017 0.018  -0.208 0.184 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.21) (0.16) 
Oldest Age 0.075*** 0.004  0.127** -0.027 
 (0.03) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.03) 
LSM Category -0.099*** -0.071***  -0.113*** -0.065*** 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Other Grant in HH -0.070 -0.068*  -0.073 -0.064 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) 
Mean Years Education -0.025*** -0.028***  -0.027*** -0.025*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
# Children Aged 0-6 in HH -0.038** -0.054***  -0.033* -0.058*** 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
# Children Aged 7-14 in HH -0.060** -0.044**  -0.064*** -0.041** 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Running Water in HH -0.022 -0.083  -0.006 -0.090* 
 (0.07) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) 
Electricity in HH 0.236** 0.107  0.242** 0.110 
 (0.11) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.08) 
Mean # mobiles in HH 0.082* 0.078**  0.085* 0.077** 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) 
Internet in HH -0.101** -0.068**  -0.095** -0.069** 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) 
Vehicle in HH 0.019 -0.012  0.013 -0.009 
 (0.06) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.04) 
Traditional rural area -0.088 -0.070  -0.083 -0.078 
 (0.07) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) 
Commercial agricultural 
area 
-0.140 -0.137  -0.079 -0.182* 
 (0.11) (0.09)  (0.13) (0.10) 
Constant -3.615** 0.628  -6.577* 2.374 
 (1.65) (0.81)  (3.50) (1.80) 
R-Squared 0.262 0.220  0.228 0.198 
N 370 615  370 615 
Source: GHS 2014. Own Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Weighted using household weights. 2. ‘Mean years education’ is the mean years of education for adult 
household members. 3. The base area dummy is urban. 3. Province dummies are included in each regression but 
not reported. 
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Table 18: Non-parametric OLS and fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of pension 
receipt on Informality Measure III 
 OLS  2SLS 
Informality Measure III 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Double 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Double 
Optimal 
Bandwidth 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Old-Age Pension in HH -0.022 -0.011  -0.033 0.050 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.04) 
Oldest Age 0.033*** 0.002  0.036 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.01) 
LSM Category -0.019* -0.012*  -0.019* -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Other Grant in HH -0.026 -0.027*  -0.026 -0.027* 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Mean Years Education -0.000 0.002  -0.000 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 0-6 in HH -0.004 -0.005  -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
# Children Aged 7-14 in HH -0.007 -0.004  -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Running Water in HH 0.024 -0.001  0.024 -0.002 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Electricity in HH 0.046 0.021  0.046 0.019 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) 
Mean # mobiles in HH 0.004 0.009  0.004 0.009 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Internet in HH -0.015 -0.008  -0.015 -0.006 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
Vehicle in HH 0.014 -0.002  0.013 0.002 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Traditional rural area -0.033 -0.029*  -0.033 -0.031* 
 (0.03) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Commercial agricultural 
area 
0.066 0.043  0.067 0.038 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant -1.809** -0.004  -2.008 0.524 
 (0.70) (0.21)  (1.27) (0.38) 
R-Squared 0.048 0.024  0.048 0.014 
N 813 1 803  813 1 803 
Source: GHS 2014. Own Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Weighted using household weights. 2. ‘Mean years education’ is the mean years of education for adult 
household members. 3. The base area dummy is urban. 3. Province dummies are included in each regression but 
not reported. 
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Table 19: Parametric OLS and fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of pension receipt on Informality Measure I 
 OLS  2SLS 
Informality Measure I Linear 
Linear 
Flexible 
Quadrati
c 
Quadrati
c Flexible 
Cubic 
Cubic 
Flexible 
 Linear 
Linear 
Flexible 
Quadrat
ic 
Quadrat
ic 
Flexible 
Cubic 
Cubic 
Flexible 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Old-Age Pension in HH -0.014* 0.009 -0.008 0.204 0.002 1.092  -0.018* 0.011 -0.011 0.475 0.012 2.083 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (1.96)  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.32) (0.01) (2.16) 
Oldest Age 0.000** 0.000** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.019***  0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.040*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
LSM Category -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Other Grant in HH -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034***  -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean Years Education 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 0-6 in HH -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 7-14 in HH 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Running Water in HH -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019***  -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Electricity in HH -0.018** -0.018** -0.018* -0.018* -0.018* -0.017*  -0.018** -0.018* -0.017* -0.018** -0.018* -0.016* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean # mobiles in HH 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***  0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Internet in HH -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vehicle in HH -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009  -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Traditional rural area -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041***  -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.040*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Commercial agricultural area -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021  -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.020 -0.021 -0.023* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Age  -0.000  -0.007  -0.049   -0.000  -0.015*  -0.097 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.08)   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
Oldest Age Squared   -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***    -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Age 
Squared 
   0.000  0.001     0.000**  0.002 
   (0.00)  (0.00)     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Oldest Age Cubed     0.000*** 0.000***      0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) (0.00) 
Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Cubed      -0.000       -0.000* 
      (0.00)       (0.00) 
Constant 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.120*** 0.076** -0.034 -0.125*  0.149*** 0.146*** 0.121*** 0.034 -0.055 -0.370*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.13) 
R-Squared 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031  0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.023 
N 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248  12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 
Source: GHS 2014. Own Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Weighted using household weights. 2. ‘Mean years education’ is the mean years of education for adult household members. 3. The base area dummy is urban. 4. 
Province dummies are included but not reported in each regression. 5. Excluded instruments include a) a dummy ‘X’ for if the oldest household member is over 60; b) Dummy 
‘X’ interacted with the age of the oldest household member; c) Dummy ‘X’ interacted with the age of the oldest household member squared and d) Dummy ‘X’ interacted with 
the age of the oldest household member cubed. Each of the above regressions include the following excluded instruments: (1) a ; (2) a, b ; (3) a (4) a, b, c; (5) a; (6) a, b, c, d; 
(7) a ; (8) a, b ; (9) a (10) a, b, c; (11) a; (12) a, b, c, d. 
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Table 20: Parametric OLS and fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of pension receipt on Informality Measure II 
 OLS  2SLS 
Informality Measure II Linear 
Linear 
Flexible 
Quadrati
c 
Quadrati
c Flexible 
Cubic 
Cubic 
Flexible 
 Linear 
Linear 
Flexible 
Quadrat
ic 
Quadrat
ic 
Flexible 
Cubic 
Cubic 
Flexible 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Old-Age Pension in HH 0.003 -0.092 -0.018 0.043 -0.043* 7.485  0.065** -0.016 0.047 0.274 0.011 7.670 
 (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.76) (0.02) (4.83)  (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.89) (0.04) (5.40) 
Oldest Age -0.002** -0.002** -0.009*** -0.021*** -0.041*** -0.042**  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.025*** -0.030** -0.023 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
LSM Category -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.086***  -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.086*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Other Grant in HH -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.052***  -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.052*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean Years Education -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 0-6 in HH -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***  -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
# Children Aged 7-14 in HH -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***  -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Running Water in HH -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.047** -0.046** -0.047** -0.048**  -0.049*** -0.048** -0.047** -0.046** -0.047** -0.047** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Electricity in HH 0.027 0.026 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.019  0.025 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.020 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Mean # mobiles in HH 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.217***  0.216*** 0.215*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Internet in HH -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.112***  -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.112*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Vehicle in HH -0.032* -0.032* -0.030* -0.028 -0.028* -0.027  -0.030* -0.030* -0.029* -0.027 -0.028* -0.027 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Traditional rural area -0.043** -0.042** -0.041** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042**  -0.043** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Commercial agricultural area -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.131*** -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.139***  -0.136*** -0.134*** -0.132*** -0.141*** -0.133*** -0.142*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Age  0.001  0.005  -0.283   0.001  0.001  -0.294 
  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.19)   (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.21) 
Oldest Age Squared   0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001    0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Age 
Squared 
   -0.000  0.004     -0.000  0.004 
   (0.00)  (0.00)     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Oldest Age Cubed     -0.000*** -0.000      -0.000 0.000 
     (0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) (0.00) 
Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Cubed      -0.000       -0.000 
      (0.00)       (0.00) 
Constant 0.817*** 0.828*** 1.006*** 1.270*** 1.540*** 1.582***  0.864*** 0.876*** 0.987*** 1.358*** 1.349*** 1.329** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.22) (0.31)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.25) (0.63) 
R-Squared 0.236 0.237 0.238 0.240 0.239 0.240  0.235 0.235 0.236 0.239 0.238 0.240 
N 4 254 4 254 4 254 4 254 4 254 4 254  4 254 4 254 4 254 4 254 4 254 4 254 
Source: GHS 2014. Own Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Weighted using household weights. 2. ‘Mean years education’ is the mean years of education for adult household members. 3. The base area dummy is urban. 4. 
Province dummies are included but not reported in each regression. 5. Excluded instruments include a) a dummy ‘X’ for if the oldest household member is over 60; b) Dummy 
‘X’ interacted with the age of the oldest household member; c) Dummy ‘X’ interacted with the age of the oldest household member squared and d) Dummy ‘X’ interacted with 
the age of the oldest household member cubed. Each of the above regressions include the following excluded instruments: (1) a ; (2) a, b ; (3) a (4) a, b, c; (5) a; (6) a, b, c, d; 
(7) a ; (8) a, b ; (9) a (10) a, b, c; (11) a; (12) a, b, c, d. 
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Table 21: Parametric OLS and Fuzzy RDD estimates of the effect of pension receipt on Informality Measure II 
 OLS  2SLS 
Informality Measure II Linear 
Linear 
Flexible 
Quadrati
c 
Quadrati
c Flexible 
Cubic 
Cubic 
Flexible 
 Linear 
Linear 
Flexible 
Quadrat
ic 
Quadrat
ic 
Flexible 
Cubic 
Cubic 
Flexible 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Old-Age Pension in HH -0.015** 0.015 -0.009 0.260 0.001 1.525  -0.017* 0.023 -0.009 0.631* 0.014 2.885 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (2.05)  (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) (2.26) 
Oldest Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.019***  0.001** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.041*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
LSM Category -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***  -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Other Grant in HH -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034***  -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean Years Education 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 0-6 in HH -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Children Aged 7-14 in HH 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Running Water in HH -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021***  -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Electricity in HH -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019**  -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.020** -0.019** -0.017* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Mean # mobiles in HH 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013***  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Internet in HH -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Vehicle in HH -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Traditional rural area -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.045***  -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Commercial agricultural area -0.023 -0.023* -0.023* -0.023 -0.022 -0.023  -0.023 -0.024* -0.023* -0.022 -0.022 -0.025* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Age  -0.000  -0.009  -0.066   -0.001  -0.019**  -0.128 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.08)   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
Oldest Age Squared   -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***    -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Age 
Squared 
   0.000  0.001     0.000**  0.002* 
   (0.00)  (0.00)     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Oldest Age Cubed     0.000*** 0.000***      0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) (0.00) 
Old-Age Pension in HH*Oldest Cubed      -0.000       -0.000** 
      (0.00)       (0.00) 
Constant 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.110*** 0.074** -0.038 -0.136*  0.140*** 0.136*** 0.110*** 0.032 -0.066 -0.389*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.13) 
R-Squared 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028  0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.020 
N 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248  12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 12 248 
Source: GHS 2014. Own Calculations. 
Notes: 1. Weighted using household weights. 2. ‘Mean years education’ is the mean years of education for adult household members. 3. The base area dummy is urban. 4. 
Province dummies are included but not reported in each regression. 5. Excluded instruments include a) a dummy ‘X’ for if the oldest household member is over 60; b) Dummy 
‘X’ interacted with the age of the oldest household member; c) Dummy ‘X’ interacted with the age of the oldest household member squared and d) Dummy ‘X’ interacted with 
the age of the oldest household member cubed. Each of the above regressions include the following excluded instruments: (1) a ; (2) a, b ; (3) a (4) a, b, c; (5) a; (6) a, b, c, d; 
(7) a ; (8) a, b ; (9) a (10) a, b, c; (11) a; (12) a, b, c, d. 
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Appendix B: Defining informality in South 
Africa 
 
Official datasets 
 
The debate around informality in South Africa is very much alive (see Heintz and Posel, 
2008; Yu, 2012). Until 2007, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) used an enterprise-based 
definition to define informality in the Labour Force Surveys (LFS), and the October 
Household Surveys (OHS) before that. This approach relied on enumerators providing a 
definition of the formal and informal sector, and then asking both the self-employed and 
employees which sector they perceived themselves to be working in. Heintz and Posel 
(2008) note that in most of the literature up till 2007, a combination of this self-perception 
question, and information on whether or not the enterprise that an individual worked for was 
registered or not, was used to define informality.12 
 
Yu (2012) explains that with the introduction of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), 
Stats SA adopted two new definitions of informality: Firstly, an enterprise-based definition 
that moved away from the self-perception question, and secondly, an employee-based 
definition, which is a combination of the enterprise characteristics and employee 
characteristics. We discuss both of these definitions in greater detail below.  
 
The informal sector – Stats SA definition A: The method currently applied by Stats SA uses 
firm characteristics to determine classification of all employed persons into the formal and 
informal sectors.13 The self-employed (employers and own-account workers), and unpaid 
household workers are all classified as informal if they are not registered for income tax, or 
not registered for Value Added Tax (VAT). Employees are classified as informal if income tax 
is not deducted from their salary, and if there are less than five employees at the work place. 
Therefore, registration for company or individual tax is the main South African classification 
utilised for defining the informal sector. It is important to note that this definition assigns 
employees and the self-employed into the formal and informal sector based on the 
characteristics of the enterprise in which they work – employees in enterprises classified as 
informal are defined as informal sector employees.  
 
Using this enterprise-based approach the informal sector (including agriculture) comprises 
18.3 per cent of total employment in South Africa in quarter two of 2015. 
 
Informal employment – Stats SA definition B: In addition to the informal sector enterprise-
based definition mentioned above, Stats SA applies an informal employment definition as per 
the recommendations of the 17th ICLS. As per the enterprise-based definition, the self-
employed (employers and own-account workers) in the informal sector, as well as employees 
employed in informal sector enterprises are counted as being informally employed. So the 
informal sector definition discussed above remains intact.  
 
However, the employee-based definition departs from the informal sector definition along two 
dimensions: Firstly, all unpaid household workers who were not defined as informal sector 
workers previously are now classified as informally employed. Secondly, the employee-
based definition identifies informal employment relationships in formal sector enterprises and 
                                               
12  Here 'registered' refers to: a) registered as a company or a close corporation, or b) registered for VAT. 
13  Although Stats SA also has an employee-based definition that measures formal and informal employment, it typically 
reports statistics pertaining to measures of the formal and informal sectors (i.e. measures derived from the enterprise-
based definition). 
63 
 
private households (predominantly domestic workers). The definition found in Stats SA’s 
Guide to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey August 2008 classifies employees in formal 
sector enterprises and private households as informal, based on three criteria: Firstly, if they 
are not entitled to medical aid from their employer. Secondly, if there is no employer pension 
contribution. Thirdly, if there is no written employment contract. An employee is classified as 
being in a formal employment relationship if s/he responds in the positive to any of these 
three criteria. 
 
Using this definition, which measures both informal sector employment and informal 
employment relationships outside of the informal sector, reveals that total informal 
employment accounts for 31.6 per cent of total employment in South Africa in quarter 2of 
2015 (own calculations, QLFS 2015Q2). 
 
Other datasets 
The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), a nationally representative panel survey, 
employs a modified version of the Stats SA definition B in order to examine informal 
employment in South Africa. This definition moves away from measuring informality using 
self-perception and combines the enterprise- and employee-based characterisations of 
informality. The modification of the official Stats SA informality definition is necessary due to 
constraints within the data, and is outlined below. 
 
The informal sector – NIDS definition 
The Stats SAmethod utilised to classify the self-employed as within the informal sector is 
preserved using the NIDS data: these workers are all classified as informal if they are not 
registered for income tax or VAT. Furthermore, all individuals engaged in personal 
agriculture are assumed to be self-employed in the informal sector. However, we are not able 
to classify employees as within the informal sector or not as questions surrounding the 
registration of their workplace for tax were not asked. For this reason, all employees are 
classified using the informal employment definition below. This means that the informal 
sector (although not total informal employment) will appear substantially smaller using the 
NIDS data, when compared with the official definition. As the formal and informal sectors 
consist only of the self-employed, these workers are termed ‘formal self-employed’ and 
‘informal self-employed’ in the analysis here.  
 
Informal employment – NIDS definition 
Employees with regular work are classified following the official definition based on the 
following three criteria: firstly, if they are not entitled to medical aid from their employer; 
secondly, if there is no employer pension contribution; and thirdly, if there is no written 
employment contract. An employee is classified as being in a formal employment relationship 
if he or she responds in the positive to any of these three criteria. Employees working in 
casual jobs or helping in a friend’s business are automatically classified as informal 
employees. This is because there are no identifying criteria to classify these workers as 
formal or informal and it is assumed that, for the majority at least, this work is characterised 
by vulnerable working conditions.  
 
The last important deviation from the official definition is in dealing with workers in private 
households, who are classified outside of the formal/informal definition by Stats SA. In the 
NIDS data, it was not possible to determine the sector of casual and self-employed workers 
in Wave 1. For this reason, private household workers are included as formal/informal self-
employed or employees, based on the definitions above. As the vast majority of private 
household workers in South Africa are female and informally employed (as seen in Table 4 
using 2012 data), this increases the share of informal employees who are female, when 
compared with the official definition.  
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Appendix C: Evaluation of evidence 
 
Bibliographic Reference Quality Assessment Indicator 
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Golub and Hayat (2014) M H H H H H H H 
Benjamin and Mbaye(2014) M M H H H H H H 
Lund (1998) H H H L M M L M 
Dinkelman and Ranchod (2008) M H H M H M L M 
Ligthelm (2008) H H H H H M M H 
Gough (2012) H L L L M M M M 
Kingdon and Knight (2007) H H M H H M H H 
Grimm et al. (2012) M M H H H H H H 
Spiegel (2012) H H H M M L L M 
Charman, Petersen, Piper 
(2013) 
H H M H H M M H 
Charman and Petersen (2014) H H H H H M L H 
Charman, Herrick, Petersen 
(2014) 
H H M M M M M M 
Charman et al. (2015) H H H H H H L H 
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